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Abstract The global financial crisis proved that banks are not the sole source of
systemic risk to the financial system and the wider economy. Indeed, systemic risk
emanating from non-bank financial institutions proved to be a key vulnerability of
the financial system. Such risks occurred, above all, when leveraged non-bank
financial institutions performed bank-like activities such as maturity and/or liquidity
transformation. However, the increasingly blurred distinction between markets,
financial institutions, services and products is not matched in the European Union
by an integrated regulatory and supervisory approach. Instead, regulation was and
remains largely organised along sectoral lines, with an emphasis on the banking
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sector. As the global financial crisis shows, this creates a risk of gaps in the coverage
of regulation and supervision, leading to inconsistent regulatory treatment of
equivalent products and/or services. This in turn causes an unlevel playing field and
increases the potential for regulatory arbitrage. In consequence, risky activities
migrate to less regulated or unregulated parts of the financial system, leading to a
largely unchecked build-up of systemic risk. Drawing inspiration from the reforms
in the United States, we propose that the EU’s system of financial regulation be
complemented by a robust body charged with identifying and monitoring non-bank
financial institutions that are systemically important. This EU authority should have
the discretion to designate a non-bank financial institution as a Non-Bank Sys-
temically Important Financial Institution (non-bank SIFI). A logical choice would
be to confer such powers on the European Systemic Risk Board. Designated non-
bank SIFIs should be placed under direct prudential supervision by an EU body.
This EU supervisor would have to establish, on an individual or categorical basis,
appropriate enhanced prudential requirements tailored to the nature, risks and
activities of the relevant non-bank SIFI. Additionally, a single European resolution
regime should be in place to ensure that non-bank SIFIs can fail without destabil-
ising the financial system. This would avoid a possible ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ status,
remove implicit government guarantees and subject the institution to market dis-
cipline. Our proposal aims to ensure that non-bank SIFIs are brought within a
regulatory perimeter and supervisory scrutiny consistent with the risk they pose to
financial stability. Such a regime would (i) help to eliminate (national) supervisory
and regulatory gaps, (ii) reduce regulatory arbitrage activities, and (iii) contribute to
the stability of the financial system and a level playing field.
Keywords Supervision  Regulation  Resolution  Systemically important
financial institutions  Non-bank SIFIs  Systemic risk  Regulatory
arbitrage  Cross-sectoral
1 Introduction
In 2001 Roger Lowenstein noted that the Fed’s initiative to organise a private bailout
of hedge fund management firm Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was not
done out of sympathy for LTCM nor to prevent losses to exposed financial
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institutions.1 Instead, the driving concern was ‘the broader notion of ‘‘systemic risk’’;
if Long-Term failed, and if its creditors forced a hasty and disorderly liquidation, [the
Fed] feared that it would harm the entire financial system, not just some of its big
participants’.2 Still, with the last financial meltdown dating back to the 1930s, it was
unclear whether ‘systemic risk’ presented a real threat. Lowenstein noted that it was a
‘parlor topic, not something the bankers wanted to spend $250 million on’.3
Any residual doubt about the threat posed by systemic risk was dispelled
10 years later when the onset of the Global Financial Crisis necessitated large-scale
government intervention to prevent the markets from collapsing.
The Global Financial Crisis painfully demonstrated deficiencies in the regulation,
supervision and resolution of financial institutions. Not only in the traditional banking
sector but also in other parts of thefinancial system. Indeed, systemic riskmanifested itself
to a large degree outside the traditional banking sector, especially in the lightly regulated
shadow banking sector. The latter refers, quite ominously, to market-based credit
intermediation outside the banking sector. Due to a lack of comprehensive regulation and
supervision, banks increasingly shifted activities to the shadow banking sector in order to
avoid tax, disclosure and capital requirements.4 Such behaviour, which is designed to
evade more stringent regulation and supervision or to evade regulation and supervision
altogether, is knownas regulatory arbitrage. The exploitation of regulatory gaps, however,
creates risks to financial stability and puts paid to the notion of a level playing field.
To strengthen financial stability, we propose that non-bank financial institutions
which are systemically relevant should be subjected to European prudential
regulation and to a European supervisor and a European resolution authority.5
Our proposals exclude banks as they are already subject to stricter prudential
regulation under the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV) and Capital Require-
ments Regulation (CRR) and, within the Member States participating in the European
BankingUnion (EBU), are subject to the Single SupervisoryMechanism (SSM) and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Within the SSM, significant banks are directly
supervised by the ECB and resolved by the Single Resolution Board (SRB).6
In accordance with the approach of the Financial Stability Board7 and the US Dodd-
Frank reforms,8 we advocate that the EU’s sectoral approach to financial regulation,
1 Lowenstein (2000), pp. 103–104.
2 Lowenstein (2000), pp. 194–195.
3 Eventually, on 23 September 1998, a group of 14 financial institutions agreed to provide a capital
injection of $3.625 billion in return for a 90% share in the fund.
4 See, for example, Adrian et al. (2015), p. 392.
5 More broadly, it is also questionable whether a sectoral model of supervision is sufficient and indeed
future-proof in the increasingly interconnected financial sector. See, for instance, Ferran (2015), p. 101;
Awrey (2016). However, this article does not seek to revisit the make-up of the supervisory model in the
EU as a whole but rather to supplement the existing framework with a robust holistic approach for the
identification, supervision, regulation and resolution of non-bank SIFIs. Moreover, while our proposal
concerns institution-based regulation and supervision this does not detract from the need for market and
product-based regulation as essential complements to entity-based regulation.
6 As regards the European Banking Union, see for example Busch and Ferrarini (2015).
7 Financial Stability Board (2011b), para. 3. See infra Sect. 3.
8 12 US Code § 5323. See infra Sect. 4.
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supervision and resolution be complemented by a more risk-based identification,
regulation, supervision and resolution of non-bank systemically important financial
institutions. Any non-bank financial institution9 which could pose a threat to financial
stability—referred to as non-bank systemically important financial institutions (non-bank
SIFIs)—should therefore be subject to commensurate supervision, regulation and
resolution, regardless of the legal categorisation of the non-bank financial institution.10
Thiswould entail partial reform and extension of supervision, regulation and resolution of
financial institutions in the EU, which is presently organised largely along sectoral lines,
and a move towards a more pan-sectoral regime for non-bank SIFIs. A cross-sectoral
supervisory and resolution regime for non-bank SIFIs would correspond with the
increasingly blurred distinction between markets, financial institutions and products.11 It
would also help to reduce regulatory arbitrage activities and gaps in coverage, as it would
ensure that the risks posed by a non-bank SIFI are subject to commensurate regulation,
regardless of the legal form of the entity. In order to properly identify non-bank SIFIs,
robust monitoring of the entire European financial sector is necessary.
The proposed regime is in line with financial reform proposals issued by the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), which call for a level of supervision proportionate
to the potential destabilisation risk that a financial firm poses to the financial
system.12 Additionally, the FSB requires an effective resolution regime for all
financial institutions which could be systemically significant or critical if they fail.13
For the development of such a regime we draw on the experiences in the US.
There, non-bank financial companies can already be designated as systemically
important. Such designation puts them under federal supervision and, reflecting
their importance to the financial system, makes them subject to specific prudential
and living will requirements. Additionally, non-bank financial institutions posing a
systemic risk may be subjected to a specialised resolution regime.
This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the development within the
European Union of a regulatory regime which adequately addresses and mitigates the
risk to financial stability posed by non-bank SIFIs. Section 2 therefore highlights the
relevance of the problemby reiterating lessons learned from theGlobal Financial Crisis,
especially in respect of the systemic risk posed by non-bank financial institutions.
Section 3 examines recommendations made by international bodies, most notably the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), in response to the Global Financial Crisis, to increase
regulation, supervision and resolution in the financial sector. Section 4 draws inspiration
from theUS regime,which is of special interest as it already provides for the designation
and consequential supervision and resolution of non-bankSIFIs. Section 5 considers the
existing body of European financial regulation. We assess what has already been
accomplished since the Global Financial Crisis and provide context to our proposed
9 ‘Financial institution’ should be understood as a broad term encapsulating all financial sector entities.
10 The FSB defines SIFIs as ‘financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider
financial system and economic activity’.
11 Ferran (2015) and Huang and Schoenmaker (2014).
12 Financial Stability Board (2013c), p. 18.
13 Financial Stability Board (2011a).
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regime of non-bank SIFI supervision and resolution. Section 6 makes suggestions and
explores legal possibilities for enhancing the existing body of European financial
regulation by including designation, supervision and resolution of non-bank SIFIs at the
European level. Section 7 contains our concluding remarks.
2 Systemic Risk
The Global Financial Crisis highlighted a number of structural weaknesses in the
worldwide financial system and economies. One of the most important lessons was
the, generally unforeseen, possibility of systemic risk originating from non-bank
financial institutions.
Systemic risk is the risk that a national, regional or the global, financial system
will break down.14 Systemic risks manifest themselves where a localised shock—
such as the failure of a financial institution—has repercussions that adversely affect
the broader economy.15 It thus poses a threat to financial stability.16 Systemic risk
can manifest itself in many different forms and within a range of financial
institutions. As noted by Anabtawi and Schwarcz, systemic risks do not distinguish
between financial market participants.17 Systemic risk should therefore be regarded
as an elusive concept, not confined to certain institutions, markets or products.18
Accordingly, financial regulation should have an equally flexible and open scope.
Despite the regulatory focus, it turned out that systemic risk was not confined to the
(retail) banking sector. Non-bank financial institutions such as Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), American International Group (AIG) and Reserve Primary
proved equally capable of creating systemic risk. This realisation is reflected in the
European Systemic Risk Board Regulation, which acknowledges that all types of
financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may potentially be systemically
important to some degree.19 Additionally, both the legislative proposal of the European
Commission (Commission) on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central
counterparties (CCPs)20 and its proposal for the creation of a new supervisory
14 Scott (2010), p. 764.
15 Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011) p. 1351. Schwarcz further defines systemic risk as ‘the risk that (i) an
economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either
(X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced
by substantial financial-market price volatility.’ See Schwarcz (2008), p. 203.
16 Lastra (2015), p. 312.
17 Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011), fn. 10.
18 Indeed, the creation of suitable regulation of markets and financial products—for example by
increasing market transparency and through product approval processes—is essential for the safeguarding
of financial stability. However, this article focuses mainly on the regulation of entities, specifically non-
bank SIFIs.
19 Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331 (ESRB Regulation), Art. 2 sub
(c).
20 Recognising the central and growing systemic importance of CCPs—resulting from the G20
commitment to clear additional classes of over-the-counter derivatives with CCPs—the European
Commission proposed recovery and resolution measures to safeguard financial stability. See Proposal for
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mechanism for CCPs aim to regulate and supervise the systemic risk posed by CCPs.21
This illustrates our premise that non-bank financial institutions are equally capable of
posing systemic risks.22 Asset management activities are another example of a potential
source of non-bank systemic risk which has recently attracted attention.23
TheCommission’s proposal for the establishment of aCapitalMarketsUnion (CMU)
is also of interest as the envisaged growth of non-bank credit intermediation makes
overarching checks on systemic risks even more pressing.24 Designed to increase the
supply of alternative sources of financing—thereby reducing dependence on funding
through the banking sector—the CMU proposal looks to increase the role of non-bank
financial intermediaries.25 Such diversification of funding improves the allocation of
capital and diversification of risk and thereby strengthens theEuropeanfinancial system.
At the same time, as recognised by the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’, closer integration of
capital markets and gradual removal of remaining national barriers necessitates an
expansion and strengthening of the available tools tomanage financial players’ systemic
risks prudently (macro-prudential toolkit) and to strengthen the supervisory framework
to ensure the solidity of all financial actors.26 This should, according to the report,
ultimately lead to a single European capital markets supervisor.27
This shows that systemic risk can occur in different sectors, or indeed across
different sectors, and have a variety of distinct characteristics. Therefore it might be
difficult to identify such risks. It is therefore of great importance for jurisdictions to
have a broad monitoring system in place, capable of identifying systemic risk
throughout the entire financial sector.
2.1 Deregulation and Growth of the Financial Sector
As this article aims to contribute to the discussion on how to alleviate systemic risk,
specifically in regard to non-bank financial institutions, a short consideration of the
role of such entities in the manifestation of systemic risk, especially during the
Global Financial Crisis, is in order.
Footnote 20 continued
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and
resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No. 1095/2010, (EU) No. 648/2012,
and (EU) 2015/2365, COM(2016) 856 final.
21 See on the supervision of CCPs Sect. 5.2.2.
22 At the same time, CCPs have very specific market infrastructural functions which, in their case, might
warrant a specific, sectoral, approach to their regulation and supervision. As our paper focuses on bank-
like risks occurring in non-bank financial institutions, CCPs fall outside the scope of our proposed
regulatory reforms owing to their specific activities.
23 See Financial Stability Board (2017c); Doyle et al. (2016). The FSB found that the worldwide assets
under management rose from $53.6 trillion in 2005 to $76.7 trillion in 2015, equating to 40% of global
financial system assets. It identified a number of potential financial stability risks in asset management
activities. This is discussed in Sect. 3.1.
24 See also: Ve´ron and Wolff (2016); Alexander (2015).
25 European Commission (2015b).
26 Juncker et al. (2015), p. 12.
27 Juncker et al. (2015), p. 12. See extensively on CMU: Busch et al. (2018a); Busch (2017).
306 D. Busch, M. B. J. Rijn
123
By the mid-1990s the financial sectors in the EU and US were thriving.
Technological advances, for instance in information services, led to economy-of-
scale benefits.28 Additionally, the perception that some of the largest financial
institutions were Too-Big-To-Fail provided them with implicit guarantees, thereby
generating additional confidence and growth.29
At the same time, financial institutions, notably banks, successfully advocated
deregulation and the removal of obstacles to growth and competition.30 In 1994 this
led theUS to allow bank holding companies to acquire bank subsidiaries in all states.31
In 1999 this was followed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act which repealed the
restriction on affiliations between banks and securities firms imposed by the Glass–
Steagall Act. As a consequence, banks were allowed to underwrite and sell securities
and insurance products. Conversely, it allowed securities firms and investment banks
to take deposits. Such developments paved the way for large-scale consolidation and
growth within and across the banking, securities and insurance sector.32 Boosted by
progress in the creation of an internal market—specifically through the abolition of
obstacles to the free flow of goods, persons, services and capital and the creation of the
euro in 1999—a similar trend of increased cross-border activities, consolidation, and
growth of financial institutions was evident in the European Union.33
The financial supervisory and regulatory regimes remained, however, highly
fragmented both geographically and sectorally. In the US, competition between
supervisors led to a race to the bottom and, in the absence of a robust consolidated
supervisor, regulators failed to identify excessive risks and unsound practices in
non-bank financial institutions.34 Securities firms, for example, were allowed to
28 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 52.
29 See, for instance, Santos (2014); Brewer and Jagtiani (2013); Baker and McArthur (2009).
30 This led the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to conclude that: ‘More than 30 years of
deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, championed by former Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive administrations and Congresses,
and actively pushed by the powerful financial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards,
which could have helped avoid catastrophe. This approach had opened up gaps in oversight of critical
areas with trillions of dollars at risk, such as the shadow banking system and over-the-counter derivatives
markets.’ See Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. xviii.
31 Achieved through the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which effectively
repealed federally imposed geographical banking restrictions imposed by the McFadden Act of 1927.
32 ‘Between 1990 and 2005, 74 ‘‘megamergers’’ occurred involving banks with assets of more than $10
billion each. Meanwhile the 10 largest jumped from owning 25% of the industry’s assets to 50%’. See
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), pp. 52–53.
33 See inter alia: Eichengreen (2015), chapter 6; Wolf (2014).
34 US investment banks, for instance, were free to choose their consolidated regulator. All five major US
investment banks opted for supervision under the Consolidated Supervised Entity program of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In turn, the SEC applied light capital requirements and
never assigned on-site examiners. In a 2008 report the Fed noted that the biggest problem investment
banks had with structuring in a way that they would be supervised by the Fed is the ‘comprehensiveness
of our supervisory approach, particularly when compared to alternatives such as Office of Thrift
Supervision or [SEC] holding company supervision. Concerns about the [Fed’s] supervisory approach
relate to both its extent (reach into the broader holding company and unregulated subsidiaries) as well as
nature (intrusiveness).’ See Federal Reserve System (2008); Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011),
pp. 150–155; Labaton (2008).
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attract FDIC-insured deposits without becoming subject to supervision by the Fed.35
Likewise, in the EU, financial prudential regulation and supervision was focused on
banks.36 In consequence, regulators failed to identify the build-up of excessive risk
in the financial markets and non-bank financial institutions.
2.2 The Rise of Shadow Banking
The limited perimeter of prudential regulation, the focus on bank supervision and
the lack of prudential regulation in the shadow banking sector were informed by the
belief that only the banking sector could pose systemic risk. Infamous bank runs
clearly contributed to this belief. As shadow banking institutions do not attract
insured deposits ‘[t]here was little concern of a bank run’ regarding such
institutions.37 The reasoning was that such an institution could be left to fail.
Furthermore, in a worst-case scenario the government was not liable to refund the
insured deposits. Investors who contracted with these firms were supposedly aware
of the risks. Indeed, it was thought that an increase in market-based credit
intermediation, supplementing the credit provision by banks, would diminish
systemic risk.38 This proved incorrect.
Financial institutions, eager to take advantage of regulatory gaps, increasingly
moved financial intermediation outside the regulatory perimeter of the traditional
banking sector.39 There they could perform bank-like maturity and liquidity
transformation combined with highly leveraged funding structures, while largely
unchecked by prudential regulation and oversight. In so far as regulation was
present—mostly through securities and insurance regulation—it predominantly
focused on market efficiency, transparency, integrity, and consumer and investor
protection.40 Moreover, as these activities fell outside the regulatory perimeter of
banks, regulators were poorly equipped to spot the systemic risks they presented.41
The premise that systemic risk was limited to the banking sector led to gaps in
35 In order to win the securities industry’s support for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, they were
allowed to own thrifts and industrial loan companies. Through these entities, deposits could be attracted
without supervision by the Fed. Merrill Lynch and Lehman used such subsidiaries to finance their
mortgage origination activities. See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 151.
36 The geographical fragmentation of supervision between Member States proved inadequate to
safeguard financial stability in regard to international operating banks. This is illustrated by
Schoenmaker’s financial trilemma. See Schoenmaker (2013).
37 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 33. See also the report of the de Larosie`re Group on
the future of European financial regulation and supervision (de Larosie`re Report), which finds that: ‘The
conventional wisdom has been that light regulatory principles could apply to [institutions which engage in
proprietary trading] because they were trading ‘‘at their own risk’’. Evidence has shown that the
investment banks were subject to very thin capital requirements, became highly leveraged and then
created severe systemic problems.’ See de Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 24.
38 Armour et al. (2016), p. 434.
39 Acharya et al. report that regulatory arbitrage motivated banks to set up conduits to securitise assets
and provide explicit guarantees for those assets. However, risks did not, in effect, really shift from the
banks, although this did reduce their regulatory capital requirements. See Acharya et al. (2013).
40 Moloney (2014a), p. 2.
41 Armour et al. (2016), p. 434.
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regulation and supervision in the financial sector.42 Indeed, banking regulation, such
as the Basel capital frameworks, did not account for, and thus encouraged, the
shifting of risks off the balance sheet.43
While precise definitions of ‘shadow banking’ vary, we will adopt the Financial
Stability Board’s definition, namely ‘the system of credit intermediation that
involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system’.44 The FSB
propagates a ‘wide net’ approach to defining the shadow bank sector, focusing on
‘credit intermediation that takes place in an environment where prudential
regulatory standards and supervisory oversight are either not applied or are applied
to a materially lesser or different degree than is the case for regular banks engaged
in similar activities’.45 This includes inter alia money market funds, hedge funds,
insurance companies, mutual funds, structured investment vehicles and pension
funds.
The shadow banking sector expanded rapidly in the years leading up to the crisis.
Using a broad definition of non-bank credit intermediaries, the FSB gauged that the
total assets in the global shadow banking sector had increased from $26 trillion in
2002 to $62 trillion in 2007.46 More recently, the FSB assessed the total assets of
non-bank financial intermediation of 20 jurisdictions and the euro area at $137
trillion, representing about 40% of total financial system assets.47 In addition to its
wide net approach, the FSB developed a narrow measurement methodology to
narrow down shadow bank monitoring to those elements of non-bank credit
intermediation where important risks may exist or are most likely to emerge.
According to this measure, shadow banking amounted to $34 trillion at the end of
2015 for 26 jurisdictions.48 This is 3.2% more than in the previous year. In the EU,
the size of the broadly defined shadow banking sector amounted to €37 trillion in
42 In this regard the de Larosie`re report found that: ‘There was little knowledge of either the size or
location of credit risks. While securitised instruments were meant to spread risks more evenly across the
financial system, the nature of the system made it impossible to verify whether risk had actually been
spread or simply re-concentrated in less visible parts of the system. This contributed to uncertainty on the
credit quality of counterparties, a breakdown in confidence and, in turn, the spreading of tensions to other
parts of the financial sector’. De Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 8.
43 De Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 9. American Insurance Group, for example, helped European banks to
evade regulatory requirements. It did so by providing $300 billion of credit insurance for European banks.
According to AIG, this was for the purpose ‘of providing them with regulatory capital relief rather than
risk mitigation in exchange for a minimum guaranteed fee’. See Gros and Micossi (2008).
44 Financial Stability Board (2011c), p. 3. For an extensive overview of the different definitions on
shadow banking, see Pacces and Nabilou (2017).
45 Financial Stability Board (2011c), p. 3.
46 This is based on the Aggregating Flow of Funds data from six jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Japan,
Korea, UK and US) and the publicly-available euro area data from the European Central Bank (ECB). See
Financial Stability Board (2011c).
47 This includes ‘Other Financial Institutions’, pension funds and insurance companies. ‘Other Financial
Institutions’ are all financial institutions that are not classified as banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, public financial institutions, central banks, or financial auxiliaries. See Financial Stability Board
(2015b).
48 Financial Stability Board (2017b), p. 3.
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total assets at the end of 2015. This equals 36% of the total EU financial sector
assets and constitutes a growth of 27% since 2012.49
Just as in the traditional banking sector, credit intermediation in the shadow
banking sector revolves around the transformation of maturities.50 Short-term debt
is used to fund securitised assets such as Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). However,
a key characteristic of shadow banking is that it does not fund itself with deposits.
Instead, funds are attracted through a variety of wholesale short-term borrowing
markets. These include commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP),
unsecured interbank lending, and secured repo borrowing.51
2.3 The Risks of Shadow Banking
Credit intermediation which is performed through the shadow banking sector and is
not driven by regulatory arbitrage can generate economic value52 and render the
financial system more resilient by providing an alternative to bank funding.53
However, when non-bank institutions perform bank-like activities—i.e. engage in
maturity and liquidity transformation and employ leverage—without being subject
to prudential regulation and supervision, financial stability may be jeopardised.54
Shadow banking activities that derive their value (exclusively) from avoiding costly
regulation thus proved to be a central weakness of the financial system.55 It follows
that the less stringent—or even lack of—regulation and supervision of the shadow
banking sector was not in accordance with the systemic risks posed by it.56 These
risks manifested themselves in 2008 when the lack of proper oversight, regulation
and a fiscal backstop, in combination with high leverage and maturity mismatches,
49 European Systemic Risk Board (2016a).
50 Hal S. Scott notes that ‘[a]lthough the actual steps in the intermediation of financial assets varies, the
economic outcome of the process is virtually identical to the depository banking intermediation process:
long-term assets are converted to short-term debt instruments, often with exceptionally short maturities.
In 2008, for example, 69% of total outstanding commercial paper had maturities of 1–4 days and 75% of
9 days or less’. See Scott (2016), p. 69.
51 Scott (2016), p. 68.
52 Value can be derived through specialisation and, related, efficiency gains. See Pozsar et al. (2010),
pp. 45–46; Schwarcz (2011), p. 624.
53 The Commission’s Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union is, in part, based on the premise
that ‘integrated financial and capital markets can help Member States, especially those inside the euro
area, share the impact of shocks. By opening up a wider range of funding sources, it will help to share
financial risks and mean that EU citizens and companies are less vulnerable to banking contractions.’ See
European Commission (2015a).
54 Lax oversight on the shadow banking sector, was for example apparent in the US, where the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was charged with regulating money market funds and
securities firms. As its mandate was limited to the protection of investors it did not, besides imposing
capital requirements on broker dealers, focus on the safety and soundness of the firms. As a consequence,
they could hold an unchecked amount of leverage. As Paul Volcker put it ‘there was no regulation’. See
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 33.
55 As Adrian et al. found ‘it was only a matter of time before intermediation designed to evade public
oversight would end badly, as occurred during the post-2007–08 credit cycle’. See Adrian et al. (2015),
p. 379.
56 See, for instance: Bernanke (2012), p. 8.
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created such vulnerabilities that a relatively small shock could trigger widespread
panic in the financial markets.
Such a shock occurred in 2007–2008 when a downturn in the US housing and
mortgage market, provoked by excessive credit provision, led to losses on subprime
mortgages and associated financial products.57 Although the losses on subprime
mortgages were substantial, running into the hundreds of billions of dollars, they
were relatively small in the context of the total financial system. For example, the
losses from subprime mortgages were no larger than those suffered when the
Dotcom Bubble burst.58 However, the consequences were substantially worse. This
was because the subprime mortgage crisis interacted with and exposed deeper
systemic vulnerabilities in the financial system59 in ways which did not occur in the
case of the Dotcom Bubble.60
Financial institutions had, through innovative financial engineering, created
highly complex financial products. As the market shifted from an originate-to-hold
to an originate-to-distribute model, loans were packaged as securities and sold to
other financial institutions. Although such products can be used to allocate resources
to where they are of most value, it can also reduce the stability of the financial
system.61 Their complexity makes it hard to assess the risks involved, leading to
investment in financial products which, in hindsight, were highly toxic.62
Additionally, and crucially, many risky financial instruments were held on the
57 Pozsar et al. point out that the shadow banking sector ‘contributed significantly to asset bubbles in
residential and commercial real estate markets prior to the financial crisis’. See Pozsar et al. (2010),
abstract.
58 Hellwig and Admati note that ‘the $500 billion loss from subprime-mortgage-related securities is
dwarfed by the more than $5 trillion of losses in the value of shares on US stock markets in the early
2000s, when the so-called technology bubble of the late 1990s burst’. See Admati and Hellwig (2014),
p. 60.
59 Ben Bernanke has identified the following underlying systemic vulnerabilities: ‘In the private sector,
some key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage; excessive dependence on unstable short-term
funding; deficiencies in risk management in major financial firms; and the use of exotic and
nontransparent financial instruments that obscured concentrations of risk. In the public sector, my list of
vulnerabilities would include gaps in the regulatory structure that allowed systemically important firms
and markets to escape comprehensive supervision; failures of supervisors to effectively apply some
existing authorities; and insufficient attention to threats to the stability of the system as a whole (that is,
the lack of a macroprudential focus in regulation and supervision)’. See Bernanke (2012).
60 When the Dotcom Bubble burst, shareholders suffered losses on dramatically overpriced tech
companies. These shareholders were mostly final investors, as financial institutions held a relatively small
amount of these shares. While these shareholders ended up with substantial losses on their equity
holdings, they were not transmitted to other institutions and did not cause widespread financial instability.
Hellwig and Admati point out that had banks owned 10% of the shares of listed companies, their losses
would have been greater than the subprime losses. See Admati and Hellwig (2014), p. 256.
61 Kenneth R. French et al. find that there is ‘a trade-off between financial innovation and stability’. See
French et al. (2010), p. 25.
62 Martin Wolf notes that ‘risk had been distributed not to those best able to bear it, but to those least able
to understand it’. See Wolf (2014), p. 19.
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balance sheets of financial institutions.63 Subsequent losses on subprime-related
financial products proved devastating for the highly leveraged financial firms which
held them on their balance sheets. Those losses extended well beyond the banking
sector. Shadow bank entities such as investment funds, insurance companies
(including monoline insurers which guaranteed mortgage securities) and other
institutional investors all experienced massive losses related to the subprime
mortgage market. It should be recalled that banks and shadow banking entities are
highly interconnected as many different financial institutions are involved at various
stages of the credit intermediation process.64 Banks shifted risks off their balance
sheets and into shadow bank entities in order to take advantage of regulatory
arbitrage. However, when these entities failed, banks sometimes preferred to
support them beyond their contractual obligation or equity ties, mainly to avoid
reputational risks.65 This is referred to as ‘step-in’ risk, as it provides an additional
channel of contagion between the banking and the shadow banking system.66 As a
consequence, the systemic relevance of shadow bank entities stems for a large part
from their connectedness with the rest of the financial system.67
During the Global Financial Crisis, authorities were forced to take a range of
unconventional measures to provide liquidity and stability to the financial markets,
starting with their traditional function of lender of last resort. In the US the Fed
provided a discount window to eligible commercial banks. This proved ineffective
as concerns of being stigmatised made banks hesitant to use it.68 Furthermore, for
63 Indeed, Raghuram G. Rajan finds that ‘the central cause for the financial panic was not so much that
the banks packaged and distributed low-quality subprime mortgage-backed securities but that they held
on to substantial quantities themselves, either on or off their balance sheets, financing these holdings with
short-term debt’. See Rajan (2011), p. 17.
64 Cetorelli points out that at least part of such a ‘credit intermediation chain’ operates ‘outside the
purview of the prudential regulator and without explicit access to government backstops traditionally
available to prudentially regulated intermediaries’. She also observes an ongoing trend of commercial
banks evolving into ‘increasingly complex financial conglomerates, integrating under common ownership
and control the non-bank entities operating along the modern credit intermediation chains’. Cetorelli
(2014), pp. 5–6. For a first study on the exposures of EU banks to shadow banking entities within the
global financial system, see Abad et al. (2017).
65 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017), p. 1.
66 A staff report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that in the month following
Lehman’s failure 29 Money Market Funds (MMFs) would have ‘broken the buck’ without guarantees
from their sponsors. See McCabe et al. (2012), p. 30. The systemic risk posed by MMFs in the EU has
been recognised by the Commission, which found that ‘[d]uring periods of high market turbulence, it is
difficult for these funds to maintain liquidity and stability, particularly in the face of investor runs.
Consequently, they could pose a serious risk of contagion’. See European Commission (2013).
67 Due to the inter-institutional connectedness of financial institutions local shocks, amplified further by
contagion effects, may turn into a broader systemic crisis. For instance, the primary counterparties of
investment banks were many of the largest commercial banks. The ESRB has also recognised that banks
are highly interconnected with shadow banking entities. It found that over 8% of euro area banks assets
are linked to euro area investment funds and other financial institutions through loans, debt securities and
equity or investment fund shares. See European Systemic Risk Board (2017), p. 3. See also: Schwarcz and
Zaring (2016), p. 12; Anabtawi and Schwarcz (2011), pp. 1352–1355; For an analysis of the role of
connectedness, correlation and contagion, see Scott (2016).
68 ‘The problem with the discount window is that people don’t like to use it because they view it as a risk
that they will be viewed as weak’, according to William Dudley, then head of the capital markets group at
the New York Fed. See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 274.
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the purposes of the broader financial system, the Fed normally relied on the banks to
lend part of the received liquidity to solvent non-bank institutions. But this did not
happen to the extent that it had in the past.69 This led to a number of programmes for
the provision of liquidity to primary dealers.70 Despite these efforts, Lehman
Brothers—a shadow bank—filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008.71
After Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy the markets for the rollover of short-term
debt, through interbank lending, repo and ABCP, froze.72 Uncertainty about the
institutions’ health and about the prices of posted collateral caused lenders to stop
extending credit.73 Reserve Primary Fund, a money market fund (MMF), had
heavily invested in commercial paper issued by Lehman Brothers. During the days
following Lehman’s bankruptcy, redemption requests to Reserve Primary consti-
tuted about half of the fund’s liabilities. This caused Reserve Primary to ‘break the
buck’ on 16 September 2008 when shares were redeemed below their 1$ face value.
This caused money market funds to experience run-like behaviour.74 This in turn
left the US Department of Treasury no other option than to guarantee a net asset
value of $1 on the shares of all MMFs in order to relieve panic in the financial
markets.
Another notorious example of underperforming supervision, and the systemic
risks posed by a shadow bank entity, was apparent in the case of American
International Group (AIG). AIG’s Financial Products subsidiary sold enormous
amounts of credit default swaps. Being adept at regulatory arbitrage, it managed to
select the regulator least likely to restrict its practices: the Office of Thrift
Supervision.75
69 William Dudley stated in an interview for the FCIC: ‘I don’t think people going in really had a full
understanding of the complexity of the shadow banking system, the role of [structured investment
vehicles] and conduits, the backstops that banks were providing SIV conduits either explicitly or
implicitly’. See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p. 275.
70 On 11 March 2008, the Fed launched the Term Securities Lending Facility which allowed primary
dealers to temporarily exchange eligible collateral for Treasury securities. On 16 March 2008, the Fed
enlarged the scope of the discount window to primary dealers, including investment banks.
71 The decision not to bailout Lehman Brothers was in part motivated by the wish not to aggravate the
moral hazard problem, partially because markets were thought to have had sufficient time to prepare for
Lehman’s demise. Additionally, the Treasury and Fed adopted the position that they lacked the legal
authority to save Lehman. This argument revolved around the assessment that Lehman was not only
illiquid but also insolvent, which rendered it ineligible for a loan under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. See Blinder (2013), pp. 126–127.
72 Brunnermeier (2009); Acharya et al. (2011); Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), chapters 13
and 14; Deyoung (2015), p. 842.
73 See Gorton and Metrick (2012); French et al. (2010), p. 24.
74 This problem was not confined to US money market funds but also extended to Europe. See Bengtsson
(2013).
75 To select the Office of Thrift Supervision as regulator, companies needed a thrift subsidiary. AIG
subsequently acquired a few small savings banks. This caused Ben Bernanke to exclaim that: ‘If there’s a
single episode in this entire 18 months [of the financial crisis] that has made me more angry, I can’t think
of one than AIG’. He went on to say, ‘I think AIG exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system, there
was no oversight of the financial products division. This was a hedge fund basically that was attached to a
large and stable insurance company, made huge numbers of irresponsible bets, took huge losses’. Sender
(2009).
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As has been extensively noted, the consequences of Lehman’s bankruptcy were
more severe than imagined.76 After Lehman, the scale and number of government
programmes rapidly increased.
Most significantly, US Congress appropriated $700 billion for the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) on 3 October 2008, which allowed the Treasury to inject
equity into failing financial institutions.77 Consequently—between the liquidity
facility, lending programs and asset purchasing programs by the Fed and the
guarantees provided by the FDIC and the US Treasury—a near complete backstop
was created during the crisis for the shadow banking sector.78 In this regard Barry
Eichengreen noted that ‘the failure to endow the Treasury and the Fed with the
authority to deal with the insolvency of non-bank financial institutions was the
single most important policy failure of the crisis’.79
Meanwhile, Europe lacked a robust pan-European approach to failing financial
institutions. National governments were left to their own devices. However, this
fragmentation along national borders was not reflected by financial institutions.
Benefiting from the unification of the European markets, they had stretched their
operations over many countries. In 2008, panic on the financial markets culminated
in a joint commitment by the EU leaders to support the major financial institutions
and avoid their bankruptcy by providing sufficient liquidity, funding and capital
resources.80 As a consequence, between 2008 and 2012 national authorities spent a
total of €1.5 trillion on state aid in support of the financial system.81
Many of the financial institutions which had to be bailed out because of the
systemic risk consequences—commonly referred to as Too-Big-To-Fail—were in
fact non-bank financial institutions. They ranged, inter alia, from investment banks
(e.g. Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) and insurance companies (AIG)82 to asset
managers (Reserve Primary Fund).
In conclusion, the belief that shadow banking activities did not pose systemic
risks proved to be false. One of the important lessons from the Global Financial
Crisis was that the failure of non-bank financial institutions can—and has—created
systemic risk, especially through their interconnectedness with and contagion of the
wider financial system.83 Financial institutions which deal in bank-like risks by
providing maturity and/or liquidity transformation, and high leverage are partic-
ularly susceptible to shocks. Shadow banks relied heavily (although not exclusively)
76 See, for instance, Blinder (2013), p. 127.
77 TARP was enacted through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
78 Pozsar et al. (2010), p. 71.
79 Eichengreen (2015), p. 5.
80 Council of the European Union (2008).
81 European Commission (2014), p. 3.
82 For an elaborate exposition on systemic risks in the insurance industry, see Schwarcz and Schwarcz
(2014). They argue not only that individual insurance-focused, non-bank financial institutions can become
systemically relevant but also that the correlation among individual insurance companies could contribute
to or cause financial instability.
83 Such interconnectedness is, for example, apparent from the fact that banks obtain a substantial part of
their funding from money market funds and rely on them to roll over short-term debt. See Bengtsson
(2013), p. 582. See also: Financial Stability Board (2011c); Pozsar et al. (2010).
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on short-term liabilities for funding.84 Short-term funding, typically through
(overnight) asset-backed commercial paper and repos, requires the institution to roll
over its debt when it matures. This rendered shadow banking entities vulnerable to
runs on their short-term funding, equivalent to bank runs.85 Indeed, lacking funding
through insured deposits they were even more vulnerable to runs, whereby panic
could easily lead to contagion.86 Risks posed by shadow bank entities were
aggravated by the fact that such institutions were only subjected to light regulation
and supervision. In consequence, the belief that no fiscal backstop to the shadow
banking sector was necessary proved equally false: during the crisis large publicly
funded bailouts proved necessary.
While the foregoing illustrates the enormous threat posed by the shadow banking
sector as exemplified during the Global Financial Crisis, it must be stressed that the
financial sector is constantly changing and evolving. Specific risks which
manifested themselves in the past may diminish, while other, new, risks
materialise.87 Future financial crises will probably not mirror previous crises and
have different roots. It is therefore crucial to have a forward-looking system in place
for identifying potential systemic risks in the financial sector. And once such risks
have been identified, they must be brought within a commensurate regulatory
perimeter.88
84 Bear Stearns was borrowing over $100 billion in the repo market by the end of 2007. At the end of the
first quarter of 2008 Lehman Brothers was borrowing nearly $200 billion through repos. Both investment
banks were supervised by the SEC. See Blinder (2013), chapter 5.
85 Gorton and Metrick find that ‘The 2007–2008 financial crisis was a system wide bank run. What
makes this bank run special is that it did not occur in the traditional-banking system, but instead took
place in the ‘‘securitized-banking’’ system. A traditional-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of
deposits, a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase (repo) agreements.’ See
Gorton and Metrick (2012), p. 425.
86 Hal S. Scott notes that ‘short-term financing sources are subject to the same collective action problems
and run risks that have historically plagued uninsured bank deposits’. See Scott (2016), p. 69. Hal S. Scott
argues that contagion was the most destructive feature during the Global Financial Crisis. While
connectedness indicates overexposure of financial institutions to one another—where failure of the one
brings about the failure of the other—contagion denotes an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of
financial institutions. It can, consequently, render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. Scott indicates
that given the existence of $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, contagion
remains the most important part of systemic risk facing the financial system. The fact that about 60% of
these runnable liabilities are held by non-bank financial entities underlines the importance of properly
regulating non-bank financial institutions as well. See Scott (2016), p. xvi.
87 As noted by the FSB, aspects of shadow banking which contributed to the financial crisis have
declined significantly (e.g. the use of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralised
debt obligations has diminished) and generally no longer pose financial stability risks. However, the
volume of asset management activities, which entail their own specific risks, has risen sharply. The FSB
also notes that new forms of shadow banking are likely to develop in the future. See Financial Stability
Board (2017a).
88 This is in line with the de Larosie`re report which recommends that regulation must extend, in a
proportionate manner, to all firms or entities conducting financial activities which may have a systemic
impact. De Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 23.
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3 International Initiatives to Address Systemic Risk Posed by Non-Bank
Financial Institutions
As seen above, systemic risk is not confined to the banking system. This calls into
question the notion that systemic risk can be controlled by focusing chiefly on bank
regulation and supervision. Shadow banks operating outside the regulatory
perimeter for banks were able to accumulate systemic risks virtually unchecked.
Unlike the jurisdiction of financial supervisors, the build-up of systemic risk was not
confined to particular countries or sectors. Furthermore, by focusing on the micro-
prudential health, the authorities overlooked and neglected supervision of the safety
of the financial system as a whole. This is not to say that the regulation and
supervision of banks did not need improving, as it clearly did, but a one-sided focus
on bank regulation failed to take account of the risks and consigned them to the
shadow sector.
A range of international initiatives designed to increase financial stability were
undertaken in response. During the G20 London summit in 2009 it was agreed,
among other things, that regulators and supervisors must reduce the scope for
regulatory arbitrage. To this end, regulation and oversight should extend to ‘all
systemically important financial institutions, instruments and markets’.89 A few
months later, at the G20 Pittsburgh summit, the world leaders reiterated that ‘all
firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to
consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards’.90 It is,
therefore, important to have an adequate regulatory perimeter which ensures that all
financial activities and institutions that may pose systemic risk are appropriately
regulated.91 The supervision of individual financial institutions has to take into
account—and be complemented by—supervision of the robustness of the financial
system as a whole. This is referred to as macroprudential supervision.92
The G20 tasked a new organ, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), with the
development and coordination of a comprehensive framework for global regulation
and oversight of the global financial system.93 As part of this task, the FSB has been
designing policy recommendations addressing the Too-Big-To-Fail problem of
SIFIs, while at the same time preventing regulatory arbitrage as stricter regulation in
one sector might lead to migration of risky activities elsewhere.94
In order to alleviate Too-Big-To-Fail, the FSB requires a number of integrated
policies comprising:
– Resolution instruments which enable authorities to resolve financial institutions
in an orderly manner.
89 G20 (2009a).
90 G20 (2009b).
91 Carvajal et al. (2009).
92 Lastra (2015), p. 315.
93 The Financial Stability Board was established at the G20 2009 London summit as a successor to the
Financial Stability Forum.
94 Financial Stability Board (2013a).
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– Resolvability assessments and recovery and resolution planning for global
systemically important financial institutions, and for the development of
institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements.
– Requirements for financial institutions determined to be globally systemically
important to have additional loss absorption capacity tailored to the impact of
their default.
– More intensive and effective supervision of all SIFIs.95
According to the FSB, the crisis revealed that some supervisors failed to make
appropriate risk assessments leading to an unwarranted assertion that institutions
were highly capitalised and liquid, even as some later failed. In consequence, the
FSB assessed that the supervision of SIFIs ‘must clearly be more intense, more
effective, and more reliable’.96
This resulted in a number of recommendations in regard to supervision of SIFIs,
including the following:
– National supervisory authorities should have the powers to apply differentiated
supervisory requirements and intensity of supervision of SIFIs based on the risk
they pose to the financial system.
– All national supervisory authorities should have appropriate mandates, inde-
pendence and resources to identify risks early and intervene to require changes
within an institution, as needed, to prevent unsound practices and take
appropriate counter-measures to safeguard against the additional systemic risks.
– Jurisdictions should provide for a national supervisory framework that enables
effective consolidated supervision by addressing ambiguities of responsibilities,
impairments related to information gathering and assessment when multiple
supervisors are overseeing the institution and its affiliates.97
3.1 Determining Systemic Risk
Reducing the systemic and moral hazard risks posed by SIFIs starts with the
identification of such institutions. For this purpose international methodologies have
been created for identifying global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and
insurers (G-SIIs). Furthermore, in March 2015 the FSB and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released a second consultative
document regarding the assessment methodologies for identifying Non-Bank Non-
Insurer Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions.98
The latter aims to provide a framework for determining whether a non-bank non-
insurer financial entity is globally systemically relevant (NBNI G-SIFI). The
proposed methodologies are designed to identify NBNI financial institutions whose
95 Financial Stability Board (2010b); Financial Stability Board (2011b).
96 Financial Stability Board (2010a).
97 Financial Stability Board (2010b).
98 Financial Stability Board (2015a), p. 8.
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distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic
interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system
and economic activity at the global level.99 Besides giving sector specific indicators,
it provides basic impact factors that should be taken into account. These are a
financial institution’s size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity and
global, cross-jurisdictional, activities.
In regard to asset management activities, the FSB recently presented policy
recommendations to address structural vulnerabilities from asset management
activities.100 As illustrated by the demise of Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a leveraged hedge fund, and the run on MMFs during the 2008 crisis, asset
management structures can pose systemic risk.101 The FSB identified four important
structural vulnerabilities: (i) liquidity mismatch between fund investments and
redemption terms and conditions for open-ended funds;102 (ii) leverage; (iii)
operational risk and challenges in transferring investment mandates in stressed
conditions; (iv) securities lending activities of asset managers and funds.
Besides developing NBNI G-SIFI methodology and making sector-specific
recommendations, the FSB has provided a framework for the detection of elevated
systemic risk posed by non-bank entities. To this end, it proposes a two-pronged
strategy, entailing (1) enhanced monitoring and (2) strengthening of oversight and
regulation.103 The FSB finds that, when necessary to ensure financial stability,
relevant authorities should have the power to bring non-bank financial entities into
regulatory and supervisory oversight. Therefore authorities should, as a key
prerequisite, have a regime to define, expand, and keep up to date the regulatory
perimeter necessary to ensure financial stability.104
3.1.1 Monitoring Non-Bank Financial Entities That Could Pose Financial Stability
Risks
The FSB has adopted a monitoring framework designed to identify the build-up of
systemic risks in the shadow banking system. It provides both for a wide-net
approach, which captures all non-bank credit intermediation, and a narrow
approach. The latter allows authorities to focus on the subset of non-bank credit
intermediation where there are (i) developments that increase systemic risk (in
particular maturity/liquidity transformation, imperfect credit risk transfer and/or
99 Financial Stability Board (2015a), p. 8.
100 Financial Stability Board (2017c).
101 For a detailed history on the demise of LTCM, see Lowenstein (2000). For a detailed account on the
run on MMFs see Bengtsson (2013); Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013); Chernenko and Sunderam (2014).
102 Recently this risk was illustrated by a run on numerous illiquid UK property funds following the
Brexit vote. See Goodley and Treanor (2016).
103 See Financial Stability Board (2011c); Financial Stability Board (2013b); Financial Stability Board
(2015c).
104 Financial Stability Board (2013b).
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leverage), and/or (ii) indications of regulatory arbitrage that is undermining the
benefits of financial regulation.105
The monitoring of systemic risk must take an risk-based approach in which the
extent of a firm’s involvement in shadow banking has to be judged by its underlying
economic activities, rather than legal names or forms.106 This is especially relevant
as any non-bank financial institution could perform shadow banking activities.107
Such a functional approach allows for a consistent assessment of shadow banking
activities and the risk they pose to financial stability. It allows new structures and
innovations to fall within the monitoring scope. A comparable approach is present
in the FSB’s classification of non-bank financial entities into five different economic
functions (see Table 1).
The FSB finds that jurisdictions should establish a systematic process involving
all relevant domestic authorities in order to review shadow banking risks posed by
non-bank financial entities or activities, and ensure that any entities or activities that
could pose material risks to financial stability are brought within the regulatory
perimeter.108 However, in its 2016 thematic review the FSB finds that few
jurisdictions have such a systemic process in place. It recommends that, where such
a process does not exist, there ‘may be merit for jurisdictions to establish a
systematic process to ensure that non-bank financial entities that could pose
financial stability risks are brought within the regulatory perimeter in a timely and
proactive manner’.109
The US is an example of a jurisdiction which does have in place a systematic
process for reviewing the regulatory perimeter and bringing non-bank financial
companies within (additional) regulatory and supervisory oversight. The US system
will be discussed in more detail in Sect. 4 below.
3.2 Regulating Non-Bank Systemically Important Financial Institutions
As stated previously, while shadow bank entities might create systemic risk on their
own, risks may also emerge indirectly through the interconnectedness of the shadow
and regular banking sectors. Indeed, shadow banks tend to be closely connected
with the regulated banking sector due to ownership linkages and explicit and
implicit guarantees and as direct counterparties.110 For example, the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) assesses that approximately 9% of the euro area credit
institutions’ assets are loans to the euro area investment funds and Other Financial
Institutions (OFI), or debt securities, equity and investment fund shares issued by
105 Financial Stability Board (2011c).
106 Financial Stability Board (2013b).
107 Pacces and Nabilou (2017), p. 8.
108 FSB recommendation 1A of the thematic review. See Financial Stability Board (2016).
109 Financial Stability Board (2016), pp. 15–16.
110 European Banking Authority (2015).
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those entities. Conversely, deposits from euro area investment funds and OFI
constitute 7% of credit institution’ liabilities.111
Regulatory response has thus developed broadly along two, not mutually
exclusive, lines. First, efforts have been made to impose regulatory limits on the
exposure of the traditional banking sector to the shadow banking sector. And,
second, efforts are made to expand the regulatory perimeter to capture non-bank
financial institutions.
In regard to the former, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has issued a
final standard which sets out a supervisory framework for measuring and controlling
large exposures.112 The Basel exposure framework aims to serve as a backstop to risk-
based capital requirements, as it should ensure that the maximum possible loss a bank
could incur if a single counterparty or group of connected counterparties were to
suddenly fail would not endanger the bank’s survival. In effect, this means that the
total exposure of a bank to a single counterparty or to a group of connected
counterparties must not exceed 25% of the bank’s total amount of Tier 1 capital.113
Jurisdictions must implement the large exposure framework in full by 1 January 2019.
In the EU, limits to large exposures are specified in the Capital Requirements
Regulation (CRR), which by and large matches the Basel exposure framework.114
Table 1 Classification by economic functions. Source: Financial Stability Board (2017b)
Economic
Function
Definition Typical entity types
EF1 Management of collective investment vehicles
with features that make them susceptible to
runs
MMFs, fixed income funds, mixed funds,
credit hedge funds, real estate funds
EF2 Loan provision that is dependent on short-term
funding
Finance companies, leasing companies,
factoring companies, consumer credit
companies
EF3 Intermediation of market activities that is
dependent on short-term funding or on
secured funding of client assets
Broker-dealers, securities finance
companies
EF4 Facilitation of credit creation Credit insurance companies, financial
guarantors, monolines
EF5 Securitisation-based credit intermediation and
funding of financial entities
Securitisation vehicles, structured
finance vehicles, asset-backed
securities
111 European Systemic Risk Board (2016a), p. 6.
112 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014).
113 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014), § 16.
114 Exposures may not exceed 25% of the institution’s eligible capital where the client is a credit
institution or an investment firm the exposure may not be higher than 25% or EUR 150 million. See
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No.
648/2012 [2013] OJ L176 (CRR), Art. 395.
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Additionally, the CCR mandates the European Banking Authority (EBA) to provide
guidelines for setting appropriate aggregate limits on shadow banking exposures or
tighter individual limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out
banking activities outside a regulated framework. In its consultation paper on its
draft guidelines, the EBA recognised that the Global Financial Crisis ‘has revealed
previously unrecognised fault lines which can transmit risk from the shadow
banking system to the regulated banking system, putting the stability of the entire
financial system at risk’.115 In its final guidelines, which came into effect on 1
January 2017, the EBA requires banks and investment firms to identify their
individual exposures to shadow banking entities and the potential risks and the
impact of those risks arising from these exposures.116 These risks must,
subsequently, be taken into account within the institution’s Internal Capital
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and capital planning.
In regard to step-in risks—i.e. financial support granted by a bank to a troubled
non-bank financial entity, beyond any contractual obligations—the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision has published a consultative document on guidelines for
the identification and management of such risks.117
3.2.1 Non-Bank SIFI Regulation
In regard to the expansion of the regulatory perimeter to ensure that it encompasses
non-bank financial institutions and activities that could pose financial stability risks,
the FSB has developed policy recommendations for strengthening the oversight and
regulation of shadow banking sectors.118
The FSB presents a policy framework, consisting of overarching principles that
authorities should apply for all economic functions and a specific toolkit for each
economic function, in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by a shadow banking
entity associated with its specific economic function (see Table 2).119
After being tasked by the G20 with addressing Too-Big-To-Fail problems, the
FSB also produced a number of policy recommendations designed to reduce the
chance of failure of financial institutions and minimise the impact of any such
failure. Of primary importance are its Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions (KA), which set out the core elements that the
FSB considers necessary for an effective resolution regime.
The FSB recommends that any financial institution that could be systemically
significant or critical if it fails should be subject to a resolution regime. Resolution
should be initiated when a financial institution is no longer viable or likely to be no
longer viable, and when it has no reasonable prospect of becoming viable again.
Effective resolution regimes should, according to the FSB:
115 European Banking Authority (2015), p. 4.
116 European Banking Authority (2016).
117 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017).
118 Financial Stability Board (2011c).
119 Financial Stability Board (2013b).
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(i) ensure continuity of systemically important financial services, and
payment, clearing and settlement functions;
(ii) protect, where applicable and in coordination with the relevant
insurance schemes and arrangements, such depositors, insurance
policy holders and investors as are covered by such schemes and
arrangements, and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets;
(iii) allocate losses to firm owners (shareholders) and unsecured and
uninsured creditors in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims;
(iv) not rely on public solvency support and not create an expectation that
such support will be available;
(v) avoid unnecessary destruction of value, and therefore seek to minimise
the overall costs of resolution in home and host jurisdictions and,
where consistent with the other objectives, losses for creditors;
Table 2 Most commonly reported policy tools to address shadow banking risks (by EF). Source:
Financial Stability Board (2016)
Economic
function
Entity type(s) Most material risk Policy tools available
EF1 Open-ended
investment funds
Liquidity
transformation
Redemption gates; suspension of
redemptions; redemption fees or other
redemption restrictions; side pockets;
limits on investments in illiquid assets;
liquidity buffers; limits on asset
concentration; limits on leverage;
restrictions on maturity of portfolio assets
EF1 Alternative
investment funds/
hedge fluids
Maturity
transformation and
leverage
Redemption gates; suspension of
redemptions; redemption fees or other
redemption restrictions; side pockets;
limits on investments in illiquid assets;
liquidity buffers; limits on asset
concentration; restrictions on maturity of
portfolio assets; lock-up periods
EF2 Finance companies Leverage Bank prudential regulatory regimes; capital
requirements; liquidity buffers; leverage
limits; limits on asset concentration/large
exposures; restrictions on types of
liabilities
EF3 Broker-dealers Leverage Prudential regime; capital requirements;
limiting re-hypothecation of client assets
EF4 Insurance/mortgage
guarantee
companies
Imperfect credit risk
transfer
Capital requirements; size/scope of business
restrictions; enhanced risk management,
risk sharing; consolidation rules and risk
retention
EF5 Securitization
entities
Leverage, liquidity
and maturity
transformation
Restrictions on eligible collateral;
restrictions on exposures to/from banks;
restrictions on liquidity and maturity
transformation
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(vi) provide for speed and transparency and as much predictability as
possible through legal and procedural clarity and advanced planning
for orderly resolution;
(vii) provide a mandate in law for cooperation, information exchange and
coordination domestically and with relevant foreign resolution author-
ities before and during a resolution;
(viii) ensure that non-viable firms can exit the market in an orderly way; and
(ix) be credible, and thereby enhance market discipline and provide
incentives for market-based solutions.120
4 Policy Response in the United States—Systemic Risk Regulation
This section discusses some notable regulatory reforms in the US in relation to the
identification and subsequent regulation and supervision of non-bank systemically
important financial institutions. The US practice can provide valuable insights for
possible European reform along the same or similar lines.
As illustrated in Sect. 2, systemic risk in the US manifested itself not only in the
traditional banking sector but also to a significant degree in the shadow banking
sector. Activities in the lightly regulated shadow banking sector—e.g. investment
banks and money market funds—proved the most damaging. The combination of
high leverage and the dependence on short-term (overnight) funding to finance long-
term investments rendered non-bank financial institutions susceptible to modern
bank runs. The withdrawal of funds, or refusal to roll over existing debt, forced fire
sales, which led to a further decline in asset prices. As asset prices deteriorated, the
solvency of other financial institutions holding similar assets became uncertain,
freezing short-term funding and leading to additional fire sales.121
The main regulatory response of the crisis was the Dodd–Frank Act, which was
signed into law by President Obama on 21 July 2010. Its chief goal was to address
the issues of financial stability and systemic risk and to prevent further bailouts of
the financial system at the taxpayers’ expense.122 The Dodd–Frank Act applies a
more risk-based approach to the identification and regulation of non-bank SIFIs in
two notable ways. First, by introducing a Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), a new federal regulator, charged with monitoring systemic risk and
determining what non-bank financial institutions could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the US. Second, it creates a resolution regime for non-bank financial
institutions whose failure poses a significant risk to the financial stability of the US.
Both reforms are discussed in the following sections.
120 Financial Stability Board (2011a).
121 See, for example, Admati and Hellwig (2014), p. 93; Scott (2016), chapter 7.
122 Dodd-Frank Act, Preamble.
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4.1 Designation by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
In general, the FSOC has two main tasks. First, to identify risks to the financial
stability of the US emanating from non-bank financial institutions. Second, to
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.123
The FSOC is charged with determining whether a non-bank financial company124
is systemically important.125 The designation may be made by an affirmative vote of
at least two-third of the FSOC’s voting members, including the Chairperson. In
consequence, a designated company is supervised by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (FRB) and is subject to the prudential standards set in Title
I of the Dodd–Frank Act.
More specifically, a designation may be made under either of two determination
standards: (i) when material financial distress at the company could pose a threat to
the financial stability of the US; or (ii) when the very ‘nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix’ of the company’s activities could pose
the same threat.126
Industry practitioners, commenting on the scope of the FSOC’s non-bank SIFI
determination, found that the particular segment of the financial industry they
represented does not pose a threat to US financial stability and should not generally
be subject to a determination.127 The FSOC, however, contended that it does not
intend to provide industry-based exemptions from potential non-bank SIFI
determinations. Instead it will apply the statutory standards to determine whether
a non-bank financial company qualifies as systemically important.128 The Dodd–
123 12 US Code § 5322. Additionally the FSOC has to promote market discipline by eliminating
expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of systemically important
institutions that the government will shield them from losses in the event of failure.
124 A company is predominantly engaged in financial activities if (i) ‘the annual gross revenues derived
by the company and all of its subsidiaries from activities that are financial in nature and, if applicable,
from the ownership or control of one or more insured depository institutions, represents 85 percent or
more of the consolidated annual gross revenues of the company’; or (ii) ‘its gross annual revenue or the
consolidated assets of the company and all of its subsidiaries are derived for at least for 85% from
activities that are financial in nature’. See 12 US Code § 5311. Financial activities include lending,
insuring, investment advice and underwriting. See Bank Holding Company Act, section 4(k).
125 12 US Code § 5323. The statute does not use the term ‘systemically important’. Instead it states that
‘material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could
pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States’. However, in media and literature the term
‘systemically important’ is commonly used to refer to such a determination.
126 12 US Code § 5323(a)(1).
127 Representatives of the insurance industry commenting on the scope and implementation of the
determination authority argued, for example, that the ‘products and services of regulated, traditional
insurance companies are highly substitutable and that these companies operate without significant
leverage or reliance on short-term debt and are subject to high levels of existing regulatory scrutiny.
Commentators representing the asset management industry contended that asset managers are unlikely to
pose a threat to US financial stability, and some noted that the legal distinction between investment
advisers and the funds they manage make the prudential standards contemplated by section 165 of the
Dodd–Frank Act an inappropriate mechanism for addressing any threat posed by such firms’. See
Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21638.
128 Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21638.
324 D. Busch, M. B. J. Rijn
123
Frank Act identified ten factors that the FSOC must consider when determining
whether material financial distress at a non-bank financial company could pose a
threat to the US economy.
(A) the extent of the leverage of the company;
(B) the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of the company;
(C) the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company
with other significant non-bank financial companies and significant bank
holding companies;
(D) the importance of the company as a source of credit for households,
businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for
the United States financial system;
(E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority,
or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such company
would have on the availability of credit in such communities;
(F) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company,
and the extent to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse;
(G) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of
the activities of the company;
(H) the degree to which the company is already regulated by 1 or more primary
financial regulatory agencies;
(I) the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company;
(J) the amount and types of the liabilities of the company, including the degree of
reliance on short-term funding; and
(K) any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate.
The FSOC adopted a final rule and interpretive guidance for non-bank financial
company determinations, in which it grouped all factors relevant to the risk
determination in six categories.129 These six categories, referred to as the ‘analytic
framework for determinations’, are: (i) size, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii) substi-
tutability, (iv) leverage, (v) liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and (vi) existing
regulatory scrutiny. Three of these six categories—size, substitutability and
interconnectedness—aim to assess the potential impact of the non-bank financial
company’s financial distress on the broader economy. The purpose of the other
three—leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory
scrutiny of the non-bank financial company—is to assess the vulnerability of a
company to financial distress.
In its Rule and Guidance, the FSOC developed a three-stage process for
identifying non-bank financial companies for determination under non-emergency
situations.130 In stage 1, the FSOC applies six quantitative thresholds to a broad
group of non-bank financial companies to identify companies that will be subject to
further evaluation by the Council.
129 Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21641.
130 Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), pp. 21641–21647.
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4.1.1 Stage 1
First, a financial company has to have at least $50 billion in total consolidated
assets. Additionally it has to meet at least one of the following thresholds:
– $30 billion in credit default swaps for which the company is the reference entity;
– $3.5 billion in derivative liabilities;
– $20 billion in total debt outstanding;
– 15 to 1 leverage ratio;
– 10% short-term debt-to-asset ratio.
Companies that have passed the first stage are subject to active review by the
FSOC in stage 2. Additionally, a non-bank financial company which does not meet
the thresholds of the first stage may still be subjected to a stage 2 analysis by the
FSOC based on other firm-specific qualitative or quantitative factors. After all, the
uniform quantitative thresholds may not capture all types of non-bank financial
companies and all of the potential ways in which a non-bank financial company
could pose a threat to financial stability.131
4.1.2 Stage 2
In stage 2, the FSOC, conducts a robust analysis of the potential threat that a
company could pose to US financial stability. In contrast to the application of
uniform criteria under stage 1, stage 2 evaluates the risk profile and characteristics
of each individual non-bank financial company. This in line with the belief that
systemically important designation cannot be reduced to a formula.132 This review
is performed on the basis of a company’s: (i) size, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii)
substitutability, (iv) leverage, (v) liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and (vi)
existing regulatory scrutiny. It is interesting to note that a key factor of the
determination is the extent to which the non-bank financial company is subject to
regulation. This shows that the designation process actively aims to remedy gaps in
regulation and counteracts regulatory arbitrage and thus draws systemically
important shadow banks within the regulatory perimeter.
4.1.3 Stage 3
Companies that are subsequently advanced to stage 3 are informed through a
‘Notice of Consideration’ that they are being considered for a ‘Proposed
Determination’. Review under stage 3 focuses on the non-bank financial company’s
potential to pose a threat to US financial stability because of the company’s material
131 Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21661.
132 The FSOC further states that ‘[e]ach determination will be made based on a company-specific
evaluation and an application of the standards and considerations set forth in section 113 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, and taking into account qualitative and quantitative information that the Council deems
relevant to a particular nonbank financial company’. Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012),
p. 21642.
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financial distress or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness
or mix of its activities. The Notice of Consideration will likely include a request for
information deemed relevant to the FSOC’s evaluation. The information necessary
may vary significantly based on the non-bank financial company’s business and
activities and the information already available. However, the information requests
will likely involve both qualitative and quantitative data.
The FSOC indicates that an information request may include confidential
business information.133 The additional information helps the FSOC to gain a
complete image of the systemic risk posed by a company. Factors such the opacity
of the non-bank financial company’s operations, its complexity, and the extent to
which it is subject to existing regulatory scrutiny and the nature of such scrutiny,
may not directly cause systemic risks but could mitigate or aggravate them.
Additionally, the FSOC makes an in-depth analysis of the resolvability of the
company. This entails assessing the complexity of the non-bank company’s legal,
funding, and operational structure, and any obstacles to the rapid and orderly
resolution of the company.
Based on the analyses conducted in stages 2 and 3, a non-bank financial company
may be considered for a Proposed Determination. The FSOC may, by a vote of two-
thirds of its members (including an affirmative vote of the Council Chairperson),
make a Proposed Determination with respect to a non-bank financial company.
After the company has been notified of its proposed determination and given the
chance to contest it through a non-public hearing, the FSOC will determine by a
vote of two-thirds of its voting members whether or not to subject such a company
to supervision by the FRB and the prudential standards from Title 1 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
The FSOC designated American International Group (AIG), General Electric
Capital Corporation, Prudential Financial and MetLife to be non-bank financial
companies whose material financial distress could pose a threat to US financial
stability. Metlife successfully appealed its designation in first instance, with an
appeal still pending.134 The designation of GE Capital Global Holdings was
rescinded by the FSOC on 28 June 2016 after it fundamentally changed its
business.135 Additionally, the FSOC designated eight financial market utilities as
133 Information request may include: ‘internal assessments, internal risk management procedures,
funding details, counterparty exposure or position data, strategic plans, resolvability, potential
acquisitions or dispositions, and other anticipated changes to the non-bank financial company’s business
or structure that could affect the threat to US financial stability posed by the non-bank financial
company’. See Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21662.
134 Metlife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, C.A. No. 15-0045 (D.D.C. March 30, 2016).
135 ‘Since the Council’s final determination, GE Capital has fundamentally changed its business.
Through a series of divestitures, a transformation of its funding model, and a corporate reorganization, the
company has become a much less significant participant in financial markets and the economy. GE
Capital has decreased its total assets by over 50%, shifted away from short-term funding, and reduced its
interconnectedness with large financial institutions. Further, the company no longer owns any US
depository institutions and does not provide financing to consumers or small business customers in the
United States’. See Financial Stability Oversight Council (2016), p. 2.
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systemically important. Recently, the FSOC started considering asset managers for
systemic designation.136
4.1.4 Judicial Protection against Designation
Following a Proposed Determination, the FSOC provides a written notice of the
Proposed Determination to the non-bank financial company. This includes an
explanation of the basis of the Proposed Determination. A non-bank financial
company that is subject to a Proposed Determination may, within 30 days of
receiving any notice of a proposed determination, request a non-public hearing to
contest the Proposed Determination.137 The FSOC must notify the company of its
final determination within 60 days after the hearing.
The company subjected to a final determination may, within 30 days after
receiving the notice of final determination, bring an action in the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the company’s home office is located,
or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for an order
requiring that the final determination be rescinded. The court’s review is limited to
determining whether the final determination was arbitrary and capricious.
American insurance company Metlife brought such proceedings before the US
District Court of Columbia, complaining inter alia that the FSOC had not followed
its own regulations in designating Metlife as a non-bank SIFI and had failed to
examine the costs of its designation.
The judicial review by reference to the arbitrary and capricious criterion is
narrow as the court is not able to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.138 It
may only therefore consider ‘whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment’.139 This
does mean, however, that the court must consider whether an agency has engaged in
reasoned decision-making and has not departed from a prior policy or disregarded
its own rules.
Applying this test led the District Court of Colombia to conclude that
FSOC made critical departures from two of the standards it adopted in its
Guidance, never explaining such departures or even recognizing them as such.
That alone renders FSOC’s determination process fatally flawed. Additionally,
FSOC purposefully omitted any consideration of the cost of designation to
MetLife. Thus, FSOC assumed the upside benefits of designation (even
without specific standards from the Federal Reserve) but not the downside
costs of its decision. That is arbitrary and capricious under the latest Supreme
Court precedent.140
136 See Wan (2016). However, after the ascension of Trump to the presidency momentum seems to have
shifted the other way. See Dizard (2017).
137 12 US Code § 5325(2) and Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012), p. 21662.
138 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co., 463 US 29, 43 (1983).
139 MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, C.A. No. 150045 (Metlife) citing State Farm,
463 US at 43.
140 Metlife, at p. 13.
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Subsequently, on 30 March 2016, the Supreme Court quashed the FSOC’s
designation of Metlife as a non-bank SIFI.
4.2 Supervision of Non-Bank SIFIs
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) is tasked with the
primary supervision of systemically important financial institutions.141 This
includes all bank holding companies with a minimum of $50 billion in assets and
all non-bank financial companies which have been designated as systemically
important by the FSOC.142 The FRB is tasked with establishing enhanced prudential
standards for non-bank financial companies which are deemed systemically
important.143
The FRB may establish such enhanced prudential standards on its own initiative
or after a recommendation of the FSOC.144 The prudential standards developed by
the FRB may differentiate between institutions on an individual or categorical basis,
thus allowing for the creation of tailored prudential requirements.145 The FRB may,
therefore, take into consideration the capital structure, riskiness, complexity,
financial activities (including the financial activities of their subsidiaries), size, and
any other risk-related factors of the financial institution that the FRB deems
appropriate. Such a flexible approach to regulation is warranted given the
differences in business model and risks between, for instance, insurers and banks.
The prudential standards developed by the FRB includes (i) risk-based capital
requirements and leverage limits; (ii) liquidity requirements; (iii) overall risk
management requirements; (iv) resolution plan and credit exposure report require-
ments; and (v) concentration limits.146
The FRB may establish additional prudential standards for non-bank financial
companies that include (i) a contingent capital requirement; (ii) enhanced public
disclosures; (iii) short-term debt limits; and (iv) such other prudential standards as
the FRB, on its own or pursuant to a recommendation made by the FSOC,
determines are appropriate.147
In the summer of 2016 the FRB issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
regarding approaches to regulatory capital requirements for depository institution
holding companies significantly engaged in insurance activities, and non-bank
financial companies determined by the FSOC that have significant insurance
141 12 US Code § 5323(a)(1) and 12 US Code § 5361.
142 At the time of writing a Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act of 2016 (Rep. Luetkemeyer,
Blaine) has been passed in the House of Representatives and is pending in the Senate. The proposed bill
amends the Dodd-Frank Act by providing that the FSOC determination procedure replaces the current
process under which bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more are
automatically subject to enhanced supervision and prudential standards.
143 12 US Code § 5365.
144 12 US Code § 5365 in conjunction with § 5325.
145 12 US Code § 5365(2)(A).
146 12 US Code § 5365(b)(1)(A).
147 12 US Code § 5365(b)(1)(B).
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activities.148 In regard to FSOC designated nonbank financial companies with
significant insurance activities—as discussed these are currently AIG and Prudential
Financial—the advanced notice proposes a categorization of the insurance firm’s
assets and insurance liabilities into risk segments and determine the consolidated
required capital by applying risk factors to the amounts in each segment.149
4.2.1 Living Wills
The Dodd–Frank Act provides that (i) each non-bank financial company designated
by the FSOC as systemically important and supervised by the FRB and (ii) bank
holding companies with consolidated assets amounting to a minimum of $50bn,
periodically have to provide the FRB, FSOC and the FDIC with a plan for their
rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure.150
These resolution plans, commonly known as ‘living wills’, include:
(A) information regarding the manner and extent to which any insured depository
institution affiliated with the company is adequately protected from risks
arising from the activities of any non-bank subsidiaries of the company.
(B) full descriptions of the ownership structure, assets, liabilities, and contractual
obligations of the company;
(C) identification of the cross-guarantees tied to different securities, identification
of major counterparties, and a process for determining to whom the collateral
of the company is pledged; and
(D) any other information that the Board of Governors and the Corporation jointly
require by rule or order.151
On 17 October 2011 the FRB approved a joint rule with the FDIC, implementing
the resolution plan requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act.152 The rule requires
covered firms to perform a strategic analysis of how they can be resolved under the
Bankruptcy Code in a way that would not pose systemic risk to the financial
system.153
A key goal of the actions required in order to prepare a living will is the reduction
of the interconnectedness between legal entities within a firm as ‘the inability to
resolve one legal entity without causing knock-on effects that may propel the failure
of other legal entities within the firm makes the orderly resolution of one of these
148 Federal Reserve System (2016)
149 Federal Reserve System (2016), p. 38635.
150 12 US Code § 5365(d)(1).
151 12 US Code § 5365(d)(1)(A)-(D).
152 ‘Resolution Plans Required’ (2011) 76 Federal Register 67323, based on Section 165(d) of the Dodd–
Frank Act.
153 The firm must therefore map its core business lines and critical operations, provide integrated
analyses of its corporate structure; credit and other exposures; funding, capital, and cash flows; the
domestic and foreign jurisdictions in which it operates; and its supporting information systems for core
business lines and critical operations.
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firms extremely problematic’.154 This does not necessarily imply that firms, under
the living will obligation, have to break up, but, as Thomas Hoenig, vice chairman
of the FDIC put it, ‘we want you to structure yourself so that your failure doesn’t
bring the economy down next time’ and ‘If you can’t get to that point with your
current organization structure, then you should sell assets to get to that state’.155
Resolution plans will support the FDIC by providing an understanding of the
covered companies’ structure and complexity as well as their resolution strategies
and processes. Additionally, they will assist the FRB in its supervisory task to
ensure that covered companies operate in a manner that is both safe and sound and
that does not pose risks to financial stability. Finally, the resolution plans enhance
the understanding of the US operations of foreign banks resulting in a more
comprehensive and coordinated resolution strategy for a cross-border firm.156
The living wills are reviewed by the FRB and the FDIC. They may jointly
determine that a living will is not credible or would not facilitate an orderly
resolution of the company concerned under the Bankruptcy Code. In such a case, the
financial institution, after being notified by the FRB and the FDIC, has to resubmit a
plan that remedies the deficiencies. If the firm fails to resubmit a credible plan, the
FRB and the FDIC may jointly impose restrictions and requirements on the firm or
its subsidiaries until it resubmits a plan that remedies the deficiencies. They may
require more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity ratios or restrict growth,
activities, or operations.157 If the firm fails to resubmit a revised resolution plan
within 2 years after being required to fulfil additional requirements, the FRB and the
FDIC, in consultation with the FSOC, may jointly order the firm to divest assets or
operations to facilitate an orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code.
4.3 Resolution of Non-Bank SIFIs under OLA
While living wills are intended to identify and remove obstacles to orderly
resolution under the Bankruptcy Code, in practice systemically important financial
institutions, including bank holding companies, qualify for resolution under the
Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA).158
Since the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act, the US has had three main regimes for
resolving financial institutions. A general insolvency regime is provided for by the
Bankruptcy Code. However, insured depository institutions (i.e. banks) are excluded
from the Bankruptcy Code. Instead they are subjected to a specialised regime under
federal law.159 The Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) is charged with the
application of this regime.
154 Gruenberg (2015), p. 6.
155 Moore et al. (2015).
156 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011b).
157 12 US Code § 5384(d)(5)(A).
158 That is not to say that the living wills are not also of value for resolution under the OLA. For example
a high degree of interconnectedness within the own organizational structure also impedes resolution under
OLA. See Gruenberg (2015).
159 12 US Code, § 1821, 1823.
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The Dodd–Frank Act also established the Orderly Liquidation Authority, which
presents an alternative resolution regime for non-bank financial institutions,
including bank holding companies. The OLA provide a liquidation regime for
covered financial institutions in a manner that mitigates risks to financial stability
and minimises moral hazard.160 While, in principle, the Bankruptcy Code remains
the default option, resolution under the OLA regime is preferred when normal
bankruptcy proceedings would potentially harm financial stability.
The OLA applies to financial institutions that are (i) domestic bank holding
companies, (ii) non-bank financial companies supervised by the FRB, (iii) any
domestic company predominantly engaged in activities that the FRB has determined
are financial in nature or incidental thereto, and (iv) any subsidiary of such
companies that is predominantly engaged in activities that are financial in nature or
incidental thereto (other than a subsidiary that is an insured depository institution or
an insurance company).161 Consequently, financial institutions that have been
designated as systemically important by the FSOC fall within the meaning of
‘financial company’ under the OLA as they are supervised by the FRB.
Furthermore, in order for a financial company to become ‘covered’ by the OLA
the following conditions must be met:162
1. in default or in danger of default;
2. the failure of the financial company and its resolution under otherwise
applicable Federal or State law would have serious adverse effects on financial
stability in the United States;
3. no viable private sector alternative is available;
4. any effect on the claims or interests of creditors, counterparties, and
shareholders of the financial company and other market participants as a result
of actions to be taken under this subchapter is appropriate, given the impact that
any action taken under this subchapter would have on financial stability in the
United States;
5. any action under OLA would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects;163
6. a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial company to convert all of
its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory order.
These determinations are made by the Secretary of Treasury, acting in
consultation with the President and after receiving recommendations from the
FRB and the FDIC or (in the case of a broker or dealer) the FRB and the SEC.
Pursuant to a determination, a financial company may be placed under OLA in order
to liquidate it in a manner that mitigates significant risk to the financial stability of
the US and minimises moral hazard.
160 12 US Code § 5384(b).
161 12 US Code § 5381(a)(11).
162 12 US Code § 5383(b).
163 Therefore the effectiveness of the action in mitigating potential adverse effects on the financial
system, the cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential to increase excessive risk-taking on
the part of creditors, counterparties, and shareholders in the financial company have to be taken into
consideration. See 12 US Code § 5383(b)(5).
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Under an OLA resolution, the FDIC must act as the receiver for the company. It
therefore succeeds to all rights and powers of the covered financial company. The
FDIC will operate, and conduct all business of, the financial company during its
orderly liquidation. It may also appoint itself as receiver of any failing domestic
covered subsidiary of the financial company if this would avoid or mitigate adverse
effects on the financial stability and such action would facilitate the orderly
liquidation of the covered financial company.
4.3.1 Resolution Under OLA
With the introduction of OLA, the treatment of qualified financial contracts has been
subject to a different treatment than under normal bankruptcy. Qualified financial
contracts (QFCs) are any securities contract, commodity contract, forward contract,
repurchase agreement and swap agreement, and any agreement deemed similar by
the FDIC.164 Normally a financial companies’ default triggers ‘safe harbour’
provisions enabling counterparties to terminate derivative contracts and take the
collateral. This can accelerate its decline and lead to value destruction, as
counterparties race to terminate derivative contracts with the failing institution.165
However, under OLA safe harbour provisions, specifically the right to terminate,
liquidate or net a QFC may not be exercised during one business day after the FDIC
has been appointed receiver.166 Furthermore, walkaway clauses—which suspend,
condition, or extinguish a payment obligation—are rendered unenforceable.167 This
gives the FDIC some time to find a third-party buyer for these contracts. According
to the FDIC, this provides market certainty and stability and preserves the value
represented by the contracts.168
A ‘top-down’ approach to resolution is applied, whereby the top of the financial
group (i.e. the parent company level) is placed into receivership and resolution
powers are applied by a single resolution authority at this level. The OLA provides
the FDIC with the power to merge a company with another company or transfer any
asset or liability to another company or a new FSOC-created bridge financial
company.169 The FDIC does not need to obtain approval for its resolution actions,
except approval under antitrust law when it concerns a merger.
164 12 US Code § 5390(c)(8)(D)(i).
165 See Fleming and Sarkar (2014); Scott (2016), p. 215; Schillig (2016), p. 272. The FDIC articulated:
‘A complex, systemic financial company can hold very large positions in qualified financial contracts,
often involving numerous counterparties and back-to-back trades, some of which may be opaque and
incompletely documented. A disorderly unwinding of such contracts triggered by an event of insolvency,
as each counterparty races to unwind and cover unhedged positions, can cause a tremendous loss of value,
especially if lightly traded collateral covering a trade is sold into an artificially depressed, unstable market.
Such disorderly unwinding can have severe negative consequences for the financial company, its
creditors, its counterparties, and the financial stability of the United States.’ See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (2011a), p. 8.
166 12 US Code § 5390(c)(10)(B).
167 12 US Code § 5390(c)(8)(F).
168 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2011a), p. 8.
169 12 US Code § 5390(a)(1)(F and G).
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Transfer of specific assets and liabilities to a bridge financial company may be
used to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ assets. Assets such as investments in subsidiaries
would be transferred to the bridge company. Through capitalisation of the bridge
financial company, by issuing new debt and equity or temporary operating funding
from the FDIC,170 it will be able to provide support to its subsidiaries, thereby
ensuring that they can continue operations. The status as bridge company
terminates, barring earlier termination, at the latest after 2 years, with the possibility
of an extension for no more than three additional one-year periods.171
Left behind in the failed parent company are the bad assets together with equity,
subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt. Claims against the receivership are
paid according to a statutory priority.172 At the minimum all creditors must receive
at least the amount that they would have received if the FDIC had the company been
liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Creditor’s claims in the
receivership are satisfied by the issuance of securities representing debt and equity
in the new holding company.173 Such a securities-for-claims exchange, has the
effect of what is commonly referred to as a bail-in and ensures that the new
operations are well capitalized.174
4.4 First Experiences with Non-bank SIFI Designation in the US
As previously mentioned, on 8 July 2013 the FSOC designated American
International Group (AIG), General Electric Capital Corporation, Prudential
Financial and MetLife as non-bank financial companies which could pose a threat
to US financial stability.
After the FSOC’s designation of GE Capital, the latter fundamentally changed its
business. From being one of the largest financial services companies in the United
States and a significant source of credit to the US economy, it decreased its total
assets by over 50%, moved away from short-term funding and reduced its
interconnectedness with large financial institutions.175 Moreover, it repelled its US
depository institutions and no longer provides financing to consumers or small
business customers in the United States. As a consequence the FSOC voted on June
28, 2016 to rescind GE Capital’s non-bank SIFI designation.
It seems that the FSOC’s designation of GE Capital had the positive effect of
pulling a shadow banking entity within a suitable regulatory perimeter. Where it had
earlier gained an advantage through regulatory arbitrage, this was offset by its
designation. In consequence, it had the choice to either compete on a level-playing-
field and be subjected to stricter oversight, capital/liquidity requirements, or
restructure in such a manner that it no longer posed a systemic risk. GE Capital
chose to do the latter. It should therefore be regarded as an early success of the
170 12 US Code § 5390(h)(2)(G).
171 12 US Code § 5390(h)(12).
172 12 US Code § 5390(b)(1).
173 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2013), p. 76616.
174 See for a more detailed analyses on bail-in Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015); Schillig (2016).
175 Financial Stability Oversight Council (2016).
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Dodd-Franks designation regime as it pulled this shadow banking entity within the
regulatory perimeter and effectively alleviated systemic risks.
Metlife’s successful appeal of its designation illustrates the importance of an
effective judicial appeal possibility. While the authority in charge of designating
non-bank SIFIs needs broad discretionary powers to identify and regulate systemic
risk, its decisions must adhere to general principles of law in order to avoid the
appearance of arbitrary decision-making.
In regard to future developments, it is interesting to note that the FSOC has
adopted an open approach in order to address systemic risk wherever it might arise.
Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew emphasised in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that ‘It
is particularly important that FSOC look over the horizon to where future risks may
develop’.176 Interestingly, the FSOC is now in the process of examining whether
asset managers might present risks that could threaten financial stability.177
However, as stated previously, the Trump administration seems to prefer light-touch
regulation.178
5 Policy Response in the EU
As discussed in the previous section, the FSOC’s powers to designate a non-bank
institution as systemically important and the possibility to liquidate financial
institutions under the OLA mark the adoption of a more holistic approach to the
identification and mitigation of the systemic risks posed by non-bank SIFIs. In the
EU, the policy response to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign
debt crisis has remained organised largely along sectoral lines. The most
notable reform has been the creation of a European Banking Union (EBU) which
entailed an extensive overhaul and transfer of bank supervision and resolution to the
EU level.179 Because the creation of the Banking Union is the single most important
response to the manifestation of systemic risk in the eurozone, a short account of its
institutional make-up and scope, especially in relation to shadow banking entities, is
in order. This will also allow us to assess the feasibility of expanding its scope to
capture systemically important shadow banking entities.
5.1 The European Banking Union
The European focus on the banks can be understood against the backdrop of the
euro specific sovereign debt crisis. European governments were confronted with
banks that held more debt on their balance-sheets than their gross domestic product
(GDP). Large-scale government bailouts created a colossal financial burden,
176 Lew (2016).
177 Lew (2016).
178 Dizard (2017).
179 On EBU, see, for example, Busch and Ferrarini (2015).
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consequently propelling debt-to-GDP ratios.180 As European banks are prone to
hold large amounts of debt from their national governments, any deterioration of the
state’s financial position consequently erodes banks’ solvency and vice versa.
Lacking a supranational resolution framework and a common fiscal backstop, states
remained individually responsible for bailing-out banks headquartered in their
territory.181 This burdened their finances, leading to stress on the sovereign-bond
markets which, in turn, led to a deterioration in the value of the bank’s assets.182 At
the same time, indebted governments came to rely even more on financing from
domestic banks.183 This has created an interdependence between the two, with any
deterioration of the one impairing the position of the other, a situation ominously
referred to as the bank-sovereign ‘doom loop’.184
Consequently, a credible resolution framework for banks is crucial in order to
provide a viable alternative to bailouts and a cross-border distribution of related
costs. Indeed, shifting the burden of failing banks away from national budgets to the
European level is often cited as the true raison d’etre of the European Banking
Union (EBU).185 Such a regime would, together with European supervision of the
largest banks, help to break the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks.
Ideally, it should also do so by providing a credible alternative to the dreaded,
public-funded, bailouts. It is therefore no surprise that the Euro Area Summit
Statement of 29 June 2012 proclaimed ‘that it is imperative to break the vicious
circle between banks and sovereigns’. In the same statement, the Commission was
tasked with presenting ‘proposals on the basis of Article 127(6) for a single
supervisory mechanism’.186
180 A striking example is Ireland which had a mere 25% debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2007, but had to
apply for joint EU/IMF financial assistance after the process of bailing outs its banks had increased its
debt-to-GDP to 108%. See Pisani-Ferry (2012), p. 6.
181 While States were individually responsible, cross-border contagion risks posed by failing banks led to
international pressure to provide bailouts. See Lane (2012), p. 59.
182 For a more elaborate analysis of the bank-sovereign doom loop, see Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012);
Ve´ron (2015).
183 The origin of the European Banking Union lies in the occurrence of the bank-sovereign loop in Spain
in 2012. The deteriorating state of banks in Spain eventually led the government to request financial
assistance. Spain, Italy and France, backed by EU institutions, pushed for direct recapitalisation of the
banks through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). By recapitalising the banks directly instead of
transmitting the assistance through the Spanish Treasury, it would be possible to avoid creating a further
debt burden for the Spanish budget. Germany, which was hesitant about the idea of refinancing banks
over which it had no control, demanded centralised European banking supervision in exchange for direct
ESM recapitalisation. This led to the euro area summit statement of 29 June 2012 pronouncing that ‘it is
imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. When an effective single
supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could,
following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly’.
184 As Martin Wolf pungently remarked ‘Stressed banks and weak sovereigns behaved like two drunks
trying to hold each other up’. See Wolf (2014), pp. 56–57.
185 Moloney (2014b), p. 1624. The European Parliament stated that ‘breaking up the negative feedback
loops between sovereigns, banks and the real economy is crucial for a smooth functioning of the EMU’
and ‘requires the realisation of a fully operational European Banking Union’. See European Parliament
(2012).
186 Euro Area Summit Statement, Brussels, 29 June 2012.
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5.1.1 Scope of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
The first pillar of the European Banking Union is the Single Supervisory
Mechanism.187 It should be noted that the SSM is a mechanism not a supervisory
entity.188 It is not an agency, nor does it have legal personality. At its heart lies the
ECB, which is directly responsible for the prudential supervision of significant
credit institutions and for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM.189
National authorities remain primarily responsible for the supervision of less
significant credit institutions.
The scope of the SSM is limited to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions, financial holding companies and, subject to certain conditions, mixed
financial holding companies.190 Additionally, branches established in participating
Member States of credit institutions established in non-participating Member States
are included in the SSM supervision.191
For a definition of ‘credit institution’ the SSM Regulation refers to the Capital
Requirement Regulation (CRR). According to the CRR definition a credit institution
is ‘an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds
from the public and to grant credits for its own account’.192 The key terms
‘deposits’, ‘other repayable funds’, ‘from the public’ and ‘grant credits’ are not
defined in the CRR. Nor is there any uniform approach to ‘credit institution’ in the
Member States. Consequently, the interpretation of credit institution may differ
from one Member State to another.193 As long ago as 2009, the de Larosie`re Report
pointed out that differences in the definition of credit institutions are a source of
problematic divergences between members that can lead to laxer supervision and
regulatory arbitrage. This problem has also been noted by the Commission, which
has tasked the European Banking Authority (EBA) with giving an opinion on the
187 Established by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions [2013] OJ L287.
188 Art. 2(9) SSM Regulation defines the SSM as ‘the system of financial supervision composed by the
ECB and national competent authorities of participating Member States’.
189 SSM Regulation, Art. 6(1).
190 A mixed financial holding company is defined as a parent undertaking, other than a regulated entity,
which together with its subsidiaries, at least one of which is a regulated entity which has its head office in
the Community, and other entities, constitutes a financial conglomerate (Art. 2(5) SSMR in conjunction
with Art. 4(1) CRR in conjunction with Art. 2 of Directive 2002/87/EC (the Financial Conglomerates
Directive)). A mixed financial holding company falls under the supervisory scope of the SSM when the
coordinator of the financial conglomerate (as provided by Directive 2002/87/EC) is an authority
competent for the supervision of credit institutions and is also the coordinator in its function as supervisor
of credit institutions (Art. 2(21)(b) SSM Framework Regulation).
191 SSM Regulation. Art. 6(4).
192 CRR Art. 4(1) sub 1.
193 The European definition indicates that an undertaking has to receive deposits in order to qualify as a
credit institution. This is not necessarily a requisite under national law. It follows that certain
undertakings which would qualify as credit institution under national law will not be regarded as such
under the European regime.
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perimeter of ‘credit institution’. It is hoped that this opinion will lead to a delegated
act of the Commission defining the exact perimeter of credit institutions.194
Other financial institutions are, explicitly or implicitly, beyond the scope of
application of the SSM. As made clear by Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), insurance undertakings are in any
event excluded from the SSM. Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) are likewise
excluded from the SSM if they do not also qualify as credit institution.195 Other
market infrastructure facilities such as multilateral trading facilities only fall under
the SSM regime when they also participate in banking activities.
The exclusion of market infrastructure, insurers, investment firms and other
shadow banking entities is puzzling from the perspective of financial stability. The
global financial crisis clearly demonstrated their potential to pose a threat to the
stability of the financial system.196 The limited scope of the Banking Union appears
to be primarily motivated by legal limitations and policy makers’ priority of
breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.197 Legal limitations arise
from Article 127(6) TFEU, which allows for the conferral of specific tasks upon the
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions, with the explicit exception of
insurance undertakings.
However, non-bank financial institutions are not completely unaffected by
supervision under the SSM. The ECB is charged with supervision on a consolidated
basis of credit institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding
companies that are significant on a consolidated basis, where the parent undertaking
is an EU parent institution established in a participating Member State.198 As
consolidated supervisor and in cooperation with the supervisor of subsidiaries, it has
to reach a joint decision on the adequacy of the consolidated level of own funds and
liquidity requirements.199
A financial holding company is a financial institution200 the subsidiaries of which
are exclusively or mainly institutions (i.e. credit institutions or investment firms)201
or financial institutions, at least one of such subsidiaries being an institution, and
which is not a mixed financial holding company. A mixed financial holding
194 European Banking Authority (2014).
195 SSM Regulation, Art. 1.
196 See also: Wymeersch (2014), p. 29; Ferran and Babis (2013), p. 5.
197 Ferran and Babis (2013), p. 5.
198 SSM Regulation, Art. 4(1)(g) in conjunction with SSM Framework regulation, Art. 8.
199 CRD IV, Art. 113(1)(a) and (b).
200 ‘Financial institution’ means an undertaking other than an institution, the principal activity of which
is to acquire holdings or to pursue one or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 12 and point 15 of
Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU, including a financial holding company, a mixed financial holding
company, a payment institution within the meaning of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market (1), and an asset
management company, but excluding insurance holding companies and mixed-activity insurance holding
companies as defined in point (g) of Art. 212(1) of Directive 2009/138/E. See CRR, Art. 3(26).
201 ‘Institution’ means a credit institution or an investment firm. See CRR, Art. 3(3).
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company means a parent undertaking, other than a regulated entity,202 which,
together with its subsidiaries—at least one of which is a regulated entity which has
its registered office in the Union—and other entities, constitutes a financial
conglomerate.203
5.1.2 Scope of the Single Resolution Mechanism
The second pillar of the European Banking Union constitutes the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM).204 The SRM became fully operational on 1 January 2016 and
provides for a resolution regime for banks. It places the Single Resolution Board, a
newly created European agency, in charge of the decision-making on bank
resolution.
Within the SRM the tasks are divided between the SRB and the national
resolution authorities (NRAs). The latter are directly responsible for the resolution
of non-significant entities205 and non-cross-border entities and groups. The NRAs
are, however, bound to apply the resolution tools referred to in the SRM
Regulation.206 To this end, the NRAs must apply resolution powers conferred on
them under national law transposing the BRRD, in accordance with the conditions
laid down in national law.207 It should be pointed out that, in so far as this may lead
to differences in the application of the resolution tools, for example due to divergent
202 ‘Regulated entity’ means a credit institution, an insurance undertaking, a reinsurance undertaking, an
investment firm, an asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager. See the
Financial Conglomerates Directive, Art. 2(4).
203 ‘Financial conglomerate’ means a group or subgroup, where a regulated entity is at the head of the
group or subgroup, or where at least one of the subsidiaries in that group or subgroup is a regulated entity,
and which meets the following conditions:
(a) where there is a regulated entity at the head of the group or subgroup:
(i) that entity is a parent undertaking of an entity in the financial sector, an entity which holds a
participation in an entity in the financial sector, or an entity linked with an entity in the financial sector by
a relationship within the meaning of Art. 12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC;
(ii) at least one of the entities in the group or subgroup is within the insurance sector and at least one
is within the banking or investment services sector; and
(iii) the consolidated or aggregated activities of the entities in the group or subgroup within the
insurance sector and of the entities within the banking and investment services sector are both significant
within the meaning of Art. 3(2) or (3) of this Directive; or
(b) where there is no regulated entity at the head of the group or subgroup:
(i) the group’s or subgroup’s activities occur mainly in the financial sector within the meaning of Art.
3(1) of this Directive;
(ii) at least one of the entities in the group or subgroup is within the insurance sector and at least one
is within the banking or investment services sector; and
(iii) the consolidated or aggregated activities of the entities in the group or subgroup within the
insurance sector and of the entities within the banking and investment services sector are both significant
within the meaning of Art. 3(2) or (3) of this Directive.
204 Established by Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and
certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution
Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L225.
205 Following the determination of the ECB in accordance with SSM Regulation, Art. 6(4).
206 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3) sub (e).
207 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3), fourth paragraph.
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national implementations of the BRRD, the SRB remains responsible for the
uniform and consistent application and may intervene accordingly.208 Conse-
quently, they do not have additional resolution powers granted under national
legislation.209
The SRM covers all credit institutions established in participating Member
States, regardless of their size.210 Also within the scope of resolution under the SRM
are (i) parent undertakings subjected to consolidated supervision by the ECB, and
(ii) investment firms211 and financial institutions, established in a participating
Member State, that are covered by the ECB’s consolidated supervision of the
parent.212 These entities are brought within the scope of the SRM because—to the
extent that parent undertakings, investment firms and financial institutions are
included in the consolidated supervision by the ECB—the ECB will be the only
supervisor that has a global perception of the risk to which a group (and indirectly
its individual members) is exposed—even if it does not supervise these entities on a
solo basis.213
Resolution of a parent undertaking can take place when:
(i) the resolution conditions214 are met with regard to both the financial
institution and with regard to the parent undertaking subject to consoli-
dating supervision;
(ii) the resolution conditions are met with regard to both the parent undertaking
and with regard to one or more subsidiaries which are institutions (i.e.
credit institutions or investment firms);215
(iii) a subsidiary which is an institution meets the resolution conditions and its
assets and liabilities are such that its failure threatens an institution or the
group as a whole and resolution action with regard to that parent
undertaking is necessary for the resolution of such subsidiaries which are
institutions or for the resolution of the group as a whole;
(iv) the insolvency law of the Member State provides that groups be treated as a
whole and resolution action with regard to the parent undertaking is
208 The SRB may issue a warning to an NCA or even decide to take over its tasks. See SRM Regulation,
Art. 7(4) sub (a) and (b).
209 See Busch et al. (2018b).
210 SRM Regulation, Art. 2.
211 Covered investment firms are those subjected to the initial capital requirement of EUR 730,000. See
SRM, Art. 3(2) in conjunction with BRRD, Art. 2(3) in conjunction with CRR, Art. 4(1) in conjunction
with CRD IV, Art. 28.
212 SRM Regulation, Art. 2
213 SRM, recital 22.
214 The resolution conditions are: (a) the entity is failing or is likely to fail; (b) having regard to timing
and other relevant circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect that any alternative private sector
measures, including measures by an institutional protection scheme, or supervisory action, including early
intervention measures or the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments, would prevent its
failure within a reasonable timeframe; (c) a resolution action is necessary in the public interest. See SRM,
Art. 18.
215 ‘Institution’ means a credit institution or an investment firm. See CRR, Art. 3(3).
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necessary for the resolution of such subsidiaries which are institutions or
for the resolution of the group as a whole.216
Consequently, resolution primarily focuses on and applies to credit institutions or
730k investment firms covered by consolidated supervision of the ECB. However,
when the parent undertaking also meets the conditions for resolution or when
economic interdependencies are such that failure of a subsidiary threatens the group
as a whole, the parent can be pulled into resolution along with its subsidiary
institution. At the same time, group resolution extends only to credit undertakings,
parent undertakings subject to consolidated supervision of the ECB, and investment
firms and financial institutions covered by the consolidated supervision of the parent
undertaking (SRM entities). Other institutions within the same group are left outside
the scope of resolution. Similarly, a failing subsidiary, for example an insurance
undertaking, cannot trigger resolution of the group.
5.1.3 Conclusions on the Scope of the Banking Union
The Banking Union is first and foremost a mechanism which provides for the
supervision and resolution of banks within the eurozone. However, its scope does
extend to certain non-bank entities and groups. The SSM also captures parent
undertakings which are a financial holding or mixed financial holding. The
resolution mechanism also extends to 730k investment firms and financial
institutions that are covered by the consolidated supervision of the parent
undertaking by the ECB.
This creates a complicated legal patchwork where certain non-bank financial
entities are also affected by the regime created by the Banking Union. Whether and,
if so, to what extent an entity falls within the scope of the Banking Union depends
on its legal classification (e.g. the perimeter or definition of credit institution) and
the nature of the group to which it belongs.
The partial supervision of financial groups, which excludes solo supervision of
non-bank entities within a group, but includes supervision of their parent holding,
risks gaps in supervision. Similarly, resolution at group level can be triggered only if
strict conditions are met, with the health of the group’s bank subsidiary being
decisive. This could encourage regulatory arbitrage activities as groups might
escape supervision and resolution under the Banking Union by changing the make-
up of their group.
Although the Banking Union is an ambitious and vigorous overhaul of banking
supervision in the eurozone, it risks being inflexible and setting a non-future proof
regulatory perimeter due to the rigid scope of its application.217
216 SRM, Art. 16.
217 Posen and Ve´ron also note that ‘The exclusion of smaller banks and non-banks from direct
supervision at European level could lead to harmful regulatory arbitrage’. See Posen and Ve´ron (2014).
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5.2 Other Sectoral Reform in the EU
Besides the European Banking Union, the European legislators have adopted
numerous reform measures for the financial sector.218 These can largely be divided
into regulation, either of markets or financial institutions, and supervisory
infrastructure. Both are organised mainly along sectoral lines.
5.2.1 Regulatory Reforms
Many of the regulatory reforms have, at least partially, a financial stability
objective. This reduces the potential for regulatory arbitrage, at least in regard to the
applicable entities. For instance, investment funds are subject to increased
regulation under the ‘undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities’ (UCITS) Directive219 or the Alternative Investment Fund Managers
Directive (AIFMD).220 Both directives have the effect of reducing liquidity risks in
investment funds. The UCITS Directive requires investment funds to hold liquid
assets only. Alternative investment funds (AIFs), other than unleveraged closed-
ended AIFs, must employ appropriate liquidity management and monitoring
procedures for liquidity risks.221 The liquidity profile of the investments must
comply with the AIF’s underlying obligations.
The UCITS Directive places direct restrictions on the use of leverage. A UCITS
may only borrow up to 10% of its assets.222 Additionally, synthetic leverage, which
is acquired through derivatives and securities lending and measured in ‘global
exposure’, must not exceed the fund’s total net asset value.223 The AIFMD, in
contrast, does not provide regulatory limits on the amount of leverage. Instead, the
218 For an overview of the more than 40 European Commission proposals for legislative and non-
legislative measures, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-
reforms-and-their-progress/progress-financial-reforms_en (last visited on 17 July 2017).
219 This directive concerns EU-based, open-ended collective investment arrangements which invest in a
diverse portfolio of transferable securities or specific other liquid financial assets and offers participation
to the public. See Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for
collective investment in transferable securities [2009] OJ L302/32, Arts. 1 and 3(b).
220 AIFs are collective investment undertakings which are offered to a number of investors and invest
their collective assets in accordance with a defined investment policy without requiring authorisation as a
UCITS. This broad definition captures all non-UCITS. See Directive 2011/61/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No. 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010
[2011] OJ L174/1, Art. 4(a). For a detailed discussion of the AIFMD, see van Setten and Busch (2014);
Zetzsche (2015).
221 AIFMD, Art. 16.
222 UCITS Directive, Art. 83.
223 UCITS Directive, Art. 51(3). Global exposure can be calculated according to the standard
‘commitment approach’, in which case a total market exposure of 200% of NAV is permitted.
Alternatively, global exposure may be calculated according to the value-at-risk model. This model is
recommended by ESMA for funds with more complex investment strategies. Under this model the total
value-at-risk has to stay below 20% of the net asset value, which potentially allows for more leverage.
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AIFM has to demonstrate the leverage limits set by it, for each AIF it manages, are
reasonable and that it complies with them at all times. National authorities are
competent to impose leverage limits on an AIF in its jurisdiction where they deem
this necessary in order to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial system.224
Furthermore, additional regulation is applicable to money-market funds to preserve
the integrity and stability of the internal market.225
In regard to the insurance sector, the EU legislator adopted the Solvency II
Directive, harmonising EU insurance regulation.226 The Solvency II Directive
requires Member States to ensure that their supervisory authorities can protect
policyholders and, second, to contribute to the stability of the financial system as a
whole.227 Solvency II therefore requires insurers and regulators to take account of
the asset-side risks, as capital needs to be held against market risks.
However, notwithstanding the increase in sector regulation, the potential for
regulatory arbitrage remains. The ESRB, for instance, notes in its 2017 shadow
banking report that hedge funds should be closely monitored as they are not subject
to leverage limits if regulated under the AIFMD.228 More importantly, such an
approach to financial regulation remains calibrated on ‘form over function’; in other
words, the legal label of a financial institution is decisive for the applicable
regulation and supervisor. In consequence, new financial market participants (e.g.
FinTech entities) or formally different institutions performing similar activities may
fall into regulatory gaps.229
224 AIFMD, Art. 25(3).
225 The regulation allows for constant net asset value (CNAV) for short-term MMFs investing in
government debt. A new category is introduced as low volatility net asset value (LVNAV), which may
maintain a constant NAV within certain perimeters. All other MMFs have to convert into variable net
asset value (VNAV). The regulation also introduced liquidity requirements: CNAC and LVNAV must
have 10% of NAV daily maturing and 30% of NAV weekly maturing. For VNAV funds these percentages
are 7.5 and 15.5 respectively. See Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 June 2017 on money market funds (Text with EEA relevance) [2017] OJ L169.
226 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) [2009] OJ L335.
227 Everson (2015), p. 433.
228 European Systemic Risk Board (2017), p. 18. For a discussion of the macroprudential elements and
gaps in existing EU regulation, see European Systemic Risk Board (2016b).
229 Recent examples of different institutions performing functionally equivalent services are inter alia
apparent from ABN AMRO’s prospectus. Risk factor 8 notes that ABN AMRO’s competition for
products and services ‘consists of traditional large banks, smaller banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, niche players, nonfinancial companies that offer credit and savings products (such as car lease
companies) as well as technology firms and other new entrants. Insurance companies and pension funds,
for instance, are increasingly active in the mortgage market. Not all of these parties are subject to the
same regulatory controls imposed on banks.’ See ABN AMRO (2015), p. 78.
ESMA also finds that the evolving loan origination by investment funds, has the potential for
additional systemic risks. ESMA therefore argues that it should fall under a suitable regulatory framework
such that ‘systemic risk is mitigated, and, in any case, is no higher than that posed by bank lending’. More
specifically, regulation should mitigate risks stemming from liquidity and maturity transformation and
risks related to imprudent lending. See ESMA (2016)
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5.2.2 The European Supervisory Agencies
The institutional supervisory structure provided at EU level mimics the sectoral
approach in regulation. The previous structure of informal cooperation and peer
review arrangement at EU level, provided for in the form of the Lamfalussy Level 3
committees, have been replaced by more robust European Supervisory Agencies
(ESAs). The tasks of the ESAs are delineated along sectoral, institutional lines. The
ESAs consist of the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA). They have a dual function of harmonisation and
identification of (macro) prudential risks. To this end, they draft technical standards
and guidelines which are endorsed and adopted by the European Commission.230 Of
the three ESAs, currently only ESMA has direct supervisory powers over Credit
Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories.231
The governance set-up of the ESAs is, however, such that national interests are
still predominant, hindering the exercise of powers in the common interests of the
EU. The Board of Supervisors is the main decision-making body of each of the
ESAs. The Board of Supervisors of each ESA is composed of (i) the chairperson,
who has no voting rights, (ii) the heads of the national competent authorities
(NCAs), all of whom have voting rights. There is also one representative each from
(a) the Commission, (b) the ESRB, (c) the two other ESAs and (d) in the case of
EBA, the ECB is represented. None of them has voting rights.232 As the
Commission observes in its ‘Public consultation on the operations of the European
Supervisory Authorities’ of 21 March 2017:233 ‘Experience has shown that,
depending on the circumstances, this configuration may lead to conflicts of interests
and may fail to deliver solutions and decisions in the best interest of the EU as a
whole.’234
It is interesting to note that the Commission, in its ESA consultation document,
stated that a careful reflection about supervisory arrangements is in order, especially
against the backdrop of a developing Capital Markets Union and the UK’s vote to
leave the EU. Amongst other things, the Commission asked for views to help
identifying specific areas where stronger European supervision would provide clear
230 This is related to the legal constraints on EU agencies pursuant to the Meroni doctrine. See infra
Sect. 6.3.1.
231 EMSA supervision of credit rating agencies is established in Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on
credit rating agencies [2013] OJ L146. Supervision of trade repositories in Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties
and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201. In exceptional cases, where the national competent authority does
not comply with a decision or formal opinion of an ESA and this is necessary for the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union,
the ESA may adopt decisions addressed directly to a financial institution. See Arts. 17(6) and 18(4) of the
respective ESA Regulations.
232 See ESMA Regulation and EIOPA Regulation, each time at Art. 40(1)(c), (d) and (e). See EBA
Regulation, at Art. 40(1)(c), (d), (e) and (f).
233 European Commission (2017).
234 See European Commission (2017), pp. 18–19.
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added value to overcome market fragmentation and to develop integrated capital
markets, so as to ensure that risks are being appropriately regulated and
supervised.235 The Commission is therefore considering a possible extension of
ESMA’s powers in the following areas: (1) in market segments in which there is a
strong need to support more integrated, efficient and well-functioning financial
instruments markets, (2) in areas where common solutions in the application of the
EU capital market rules are more efficient236 or (3) in areas where high integration
or intense cross-border activity entails higher cross-border contagion risks to
financial stability or market integrity.237 The Commission provides three examples
for a possible extension of ESMA’s current mandate: (i) direct supervision of data
providers, (ii) direct supervision of the asset management industry and (iii) direct
supervision of central counterparties (CCPs).
In regard to the latter, the Commission published, on 13 June 2017, proposed
amendments to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the
ESMA Regulation, with a view to regulating and supervising the systemic risk
posed by CCPs and strengthening the role of ESMA.238 In order to avoid risks of
regulatory and supervisory arbitrage the ‘CCP executive session’—established
within the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)—will be respon-
sible for a more coherent and consistent supervision of CCPs. To this effect, ESMA
may determine a third-country CCP to be systemically important, thereby subjecting
it to stricter requirements. Acting on a recommendation from ESMA, the
Commission may also determine a third-country CCP to be substantially system-
ically important. Subsequent to such a determination, the Commission may declare
that the CCP may provide services in the Union only if it is authorised in the EU.239
The determination of systemic importance of CCPs by ESMA shows clear parallels
with our proposed non-bank SIFI determination.
In conclusion, two elements in the make-up of the European Supervisory
Agencies stand out. First, despite some coordination efforts, it is based on a sectoral
approach to supervision.240 As sectoral lines increasingly blur and new institutions
235 European Commission (2017), pp. 16–17.
236 The Commission finds that this might, for example, be due to synergies or to more uniform
application of rules leading to less obstacles for market integration and less opportunities for companies
to take advantage of loopholes in order to avoid unprofitable regulations or for regulators to compete with
one another in order to attract businesses or other actors to operate in their jurisdiction. See European
Commission (2017), p. 17. These objectives are in line with our proposal.
237 European Commission (2017), p. 17.
238 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1095 and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, COM(2017) 331 final
(13 June 2017) (EMIR Commission Proposal 13 June 2017). Recognising the central and growing
systemic importance of CCPs as a result of the G20 commitment to clear additional classes of over-the-
counter derivatives with CCPs, the Commission previously proposed recovery and resolution measures
for CCPs in order to safeguard financial stability. See European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central
counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No. 1095/2010, (EU) No. 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365,
COM(2016) 856 final (28 November 2016).
239 For the role for ESMA with regard to EU CCPs, see Busch (2018).
240 See also Awrey (2016), p. 86.
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outside the traditional institutional regulatory perimeter perform equivalent
activities, an institutionally based layout of the supervisory organisation may risk
regulatory gaps. As illustrated by the crisis and described in Sect. 2, an institutional
approach to financial regulation and supervision encourages regulatory arbitrage. It
is therefore of eminent importance that an institutional approach to financial
regulation is supplemented by the existence of an authority with robust, financial
sector-wide, monitoring powers and, if deemed necessary, the power to pull
systemically important financial institutions inside a suitable regulatory and
supervisory perimeter. As discussed in the following section, the European
Systemic Risk Board is responsible for monitoring the financial system within the
EU and identifying systemic risk. Its powers, however, are rather limited.
A second important element in the functioning of the ESAs is their limited
powers of direct prudential supervision of financial institutions.241 Instead, national
authorities are responsible for day-to-day prudential supervision. Systemically
important institutions expand, however, across many jurisdictions. Much the same
arguments that underpin the creation of direct ECB supervision over significant
credit institutions therefore apply also to non-bank SIFIs. This line of reasoning is
now familiar, for example because a European authority is better placed to ensure a
smooth and sound overview of the entire non-bank SIFI and its overall health and
would reduce the risk of different interpretations and contradictory decisions at the
level of the individual entity, thereby enhancing market integration. In our proposal,
designated non-bank SIFIs, like significant credit institutions, should therefore be
placed under direct prudential supervision by an EU authority. The intended reforms
of the ESAs may therefore provide a connection with our proposal. They illustrate a
developing inclination to endow the ESAs with more direct supervisory powers.
Supervision of designated non-bank SIFIs by the most relevant ESA, as determined
by the nature and activities of the non-bank SIFI, is in line with these developments.
5.3 Systemic Risk Monitoring by the European Systemic Risk Board
The de Larosie`re Group envisaged a Union body charged with overseeing risk in the
financial system as a whole.242 This led to the creation, in November 2010, of the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).243 It is tasked with exercising ‘macropru-
dential oversight of the financial system within the Union, in order to contribute to
the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability in the Union’.244
Its oversight has a broad scope as the ESRB Regulation recognises that all types of
241 As stated, only ESMA performs direct supervision, namely of credit rating agencies, trade
repositories and, if the Commission’s legislative proposal is accepted, CCPs.
242 ‘The Group believes that to be effective macro-prudential supervision must encompass all sectors of
finance and not be confined to banks, as well as the wider macro-economic context. This oversight also
should take account of global issues.’ See de Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 39.
243 Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board [2010] OJ L331 (ESRB Regulation).
244 ESRB Regulation, Art. 3(1).
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financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may potentially be systemically
important to some degree.245
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, microprudential supervision of
financial institutions has become increasingly complemented by a macroprudential
dimension. The latter’s objective is to limit the distress of the financial system as a
whole in order to protect the overall economy from significant losses in real
output.246 Macroprudential supervision focuses on systemic risks arising from the
common exposure of many financial institutions to the same risk factors. In other
words, whereas microprudential supervision focuses on the tree, macroprudential
supervision is all about the forest.247 In accordance with its macroprudential tasks,
the ESRB monitors and assesses risks and, if necessary, adopts warnings and
recommendations.
Pursuant to its monitoring tasks the ESRB may request information from the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the ESAs, the national supervisory
authorities or the national statistics authorities. If information remains unavailable
the ESRB may request it from the Member States.248 The request may be of either a
general or a specific nature and must be addressed in particular to the Union as a
whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the ESAs, or to one or
more of the national supervisory authorities.
When the ESRB identifies significant risks to financial stability it must provide
warnings and, where appropriate, issue recommendations for remedial action.249
Warnings and recommendation may be of a general or a specific nature and must be
addressed in particular to the Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or
to one or more of the ESAs, or to one or more of the national supervisory
authorities.250 As the ESRB has no formal legal powers its warnings and
recommendations are non-binding, but they are subject to a ‘comply-or explain’
procedure. In consequence, addressees of recommendations have to inform the
ESRB and the Council of the actions undertaken in response and must provide
adequate justification for any inaction.251 A warning or recommendation may be
made public when two-thirds of the General Board agree to this.252
The ESRB does not have legal personality or its own budget. It has a complicated
organisational structure consisting of a General Board, a Steering Committee, an
Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) and an Advisory Scientific Committee
(ASC). The General Board is the principal decision-making body of the ESRB. Of
its 67 (!) members, 38 have a voting right. These are the President and Vice-
245 ESRB Regulation, Art. 2 sub (c). In the Regulation ‘systemic risk’ is defined as ‘a risk of disruption in
the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and
the real economy’.
246 De Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 38.
247 De Larosie`re et al. (2009), p. 38.
248 ESRB Regulation, Art. 15(5).
249 ESRB Regulation, Art. 16(1).
250 ESRB Regulation, Art. 16(2).
251 ESRB Regulation, Art. 17(1).
252 ESRB Regulation, Art. 18(1).
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President of the ECB, the Governors of the 28 national central banks, a Member of
the Commission, the Chairperson of each of the European Supervisory Authorities,
the ATC Chair, the ASC Chair and the two ASC Vice-Chairs. The non-voting
members consist of one representative per Member State of the competent national
supervisory authorities and the President of the Economic and Financial Committee.
Since the ESRB is charged with monitoring systemic risk in the EU’s financial
system, it would, logically, be best placed to perform our proposed task of
designating financial institutions as ‘systemically important’, in imitation of the
FSOC. To this end the ESRB’s mandate would need to be expanded, providing the
ESRB with the power to adopt legally binding non-bank SIFI designation decisions.
The related legal aspects are discussed in Sect. 6.3.1. The ESRB’s governance
structure would also have to be streamlined as the current number of 38 voting
members potentially obstructs and politicises a non-bank SIFI designation decision-
making process.
6 Towards Single Supervision of Systemically Important Institutions
in the EU
6.1 Addressing Systemic Risk: The Institutional Structure
As discussed in Sect. 2, the global financial crisis revealed the shortcomings of an
institutionally organised supervisory model.253 Financial institutions falling outside
the regulatory perimeter of traditional financial entities may engage in equivalent
activities without being subjected to adequate regulation. In the same vein, sectoral
supervisors can only monitor the build-up of systemic risk within their competence
and thus, by definition, lack a comprehensive overview of the financial sector. The
institutional financial supervisory structure in the EU should, therefore, be
supplemented by an institution charged with monitoring systemic risk build-up in
any financial institution and, when necessary, bring them within an adequate
regulatory and supervisory perimeter.
As demonstrated in Sect. 5, an institutional approach is still prevalent in the EU’s
financial regulatory structure. Because such an approach is especially susceptive to
regulatory gaps, it needs to be complemented by a robust monitoring mechanism
which has an activity-based approach of detecting systemic risk across the entire
financial sector. In the EU, the ESRB provides for monitoring of systemic risks, but
lacks substantial formal legal power. The US, in contrast, has equipped the FSOC
with substantial systemic risk monitoring powers and the competence to bring
systemically important financial institutions within an adequate regulatory and
supervisory perimeter, as discussed in Sect. 4. We advocate an expansion of the
ESRB’s powers, providing it, in imitation of the FSOC, with the competence to
designate financial institutions as systemically important and, in consequence, bring
them within prudential supervision or enhanced supervision.
253 See also Awrey (2016) pp. 84–86.
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Given the dual legal orders of the EU and its Member States, we would also
argue that prudential supervision should be performed at the EU level by an EU
institution. As systemically important financial institutions operate across national
borders, regulation and supervision should not be confined within such borders. This
brings to mind what Dirk Schoenmaker has called the ‘financial trilemma’:
increased financial integration due to globalisation and, more specifically, to the
creation of an European internal market is not compatible with both financial
stability and national financial policies.254 National supervision of non-bank SIFIs
has proved inadequate.255 This is in part due to inherent jurisdictional limitations
and the corresponding fragmentised view of the supervised institution.256 Moreover,
national authorities might be tempted to practise forbearance in regard to financial
institutions perceived as national champions.257
Similarly, the resolution of non-bank SIFIs can best be achieved by a Union
institution. Much the same arguments as for European supervision apply. Lacking a
comprehensive view of a non-bank SIFI’s business causes suboptimal resolution
decisions. Moreover, national authorities have strong incentives to minimise the
impact of failing non-bank SIFIs on their economy.258 This can result in unilateral
measures such as requiring higher capital and liquidity buffers or limiting intra-
group transfers. Maintaining financial stability is not the prime aim of such
measures. Consequently, they have the potential to cause unnecessary destruction of
the non-bank SIFI’s value and distort the functioning of the internal market.
6.2 Monitoring Systemic Risk
The global financial crisis exposed the integrated nature, both cross-sectoral and
cross-border, of financial markets and institutions. This warrants an integrated
approach to the monitoring of financial risks. In the EU the ESRB is tasked with
systemic risk monitoring. The ESRB’s powers, however, are limited to monitoring
and assessing systemic risks and, where appropriate, issuing warnings and
recommendations. It does not have formal powers and instead has to rely on
systemic risk warnings and non-binding recommendations to EU members, which
can be punctuated by a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.
254 Schoenmaker (2013).
255 In consequence, the de Larosie`re report found that Europe should be equipped with a standard set of
rules and that strengthened international collaboration in the supervision of large complex cross-border
financial groups is of crucial importance. See De Larosie`re et al. (2009).
256 The Commission, for instance, notes in its consultation on the reform of the European Supervisory
Agencies that stakeholders confirmed that the understanding and supervision of investment funds is very
different among National Competent Authorities, which ultimately limits the uptake of these funds. See
European Commission (2017), p. 17. Similarly, recital (5) of the SSM Regulation grants that the creation
of the SSM was prompted by the conviction that ‘Coordination between supervisors is vital, but the crisis
has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a single currency. In order
to preserve financial stability in the Union and increase the positive effects of market integration on
growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should therefore be enhanced’. This holds
similarly true for the supervision of non-bank SIFIs.
257 Ve´ron (2013)
258 This is also cited as a basis for the creation of the SRM. See recital (9), SRM Regulation.
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In regard to the collection of information, it is of interest to note that the ESRB
may request information of the ESA’s, the ECB, the Commission and national
supervisors, statistics authorities and member states.259 However, as the information
provided has to be in aggregate form, it is impossible to distinguish individual firms.
If, as we propose below, the ESRB is to be able to make non-bank SIFI designations
comparable to the FSOC designations, this limitation has to be removed.
In the US, the FSOC is charged with identifying risks to the financial stability of
the United States, promoting market discipline, and responding to emerging risks to
the stability of the US financial system. Its powers include the designation of non-
bank financial institutions and financial market utilities to be supervised by the
Federal Reserve Board. It may issue recommendations on heightened prudential
standards to supervisory authorities. Moreover, it makes recommendations on
jurisdictional disputes and reports on regulatory gaps to Congress.
6.3 Non-bank SIFI Designation
We propose that the ESRB be equipped with powers similar to those of the FSOC to
designate non-bank financial companies as systemically important and, conse-
quently, deserving of additional prudential regulation and supervision. This would
go a long way towards alleviating systemic risks by creating a mechanism to ensure
non-bank SIFIs are subjected to a regulatory perimeter consistent with the risks they
pose. Such a designation would be an important instrument in preventing regulatory
arbitrage. Indeed, echoing the designation process of the FSOC, we would note that
the level of regulatory scrutiny to which a non-bank SIFI is subjected is an
important factor when deciding on a designation.
6.3.1 Legal Feasibility
The ESRB could be given the power to designate non-bank SIFIs under Article 114
TFEU, as it aims to improve the functioning of the internal market by helping to
provide financial stability. Indeed, the very goal of such a designation is to make
sure that such non-bank SIFIs are regulated to an extent consistent with the level of
systemic risk they pose. Consequently, the power to make such a designation is
conditional on whether it addresses a threat to financial stability and whether such a
designation would alleviate the threat.
However, such a power of designation for the ESRB might be subject to legal
constraints on the delegation of discretionary powers to agencies. The EU Member
States have delegated powers to the EU through the Treaties. In turn, the Union
legislature may decide to delegate some of these powers to an agency in cases where
the Treaties provide for this possibility either in a specific provision or in the form
of a general competence such as Article 114 TFEU.
259 The European Commission, in its consultation document on the Review of the EU Macro-Prudential
Framework, provides that the ESRB could benefit from additional own analytical resources, especially in
areas where there is less pre-existing knowledge such as systemic risk outside the banking sector. See
Commission (2016).
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The degree to which such delegation is allowed was addressed by the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Meroni ruling.260 The CJEU
distinguished between two types of delegation. Whereas purely executive powers
may be delegated as their exercise can be reviewed against objective criteria
specified by the delegating authority, powers involving a wide margin of discretion
in determining economic policy may not be delegated. Such delegation would
replace the choices of the delegating authority by those of the delegatee and bring
about an actual transfer of responsibility.261 As a transfer of responsibility of this
kind would alter the balance of power between the EU institutions, it would be
incompatible with the Treaties.262
In its Short Selling judgment263 the CJEU revisited and revised its Meroni
doctrine. First, the CJEU emphasised that the contested delegation in Meroni
concerned delegation to an entity governed by private law, whereas the contested
delegation in the Short Selling case was to ESMA, which had been established
pursuant to an EU regulation. The Court went on to note that ESMA’s power to
prohibit or impose conditions on the entry by natural or legal persons into a short
sale or require them to notify a competent authority or to disclose to the public
details of net short positions264 does not confer any autonomous power that goes
beyond the boundaries of the regulatory framework established by the ESMA
Regulation.265 Furthermore, and unlike the circumstances in Meroni, ESMA’s
discretionary powers in regard to short selling are circumscribed by various
conditions and criteria.266 The CJEU therefore held that the powers available to
260 Case 9-56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7 (Meroni).
261 Meroni, p. 152.
262 Ibid.
263 Case C-270/12, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament
and the Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 (Short Selling).
264 As provided for under Art. 28 of the Short Selling Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of
credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86.
265 Short Selling, paras. 43–44.
266 Short Selling, paras. 45 and 53. These conditions and criteria require that short selling measures
(i) address a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the stability of the
whole or part of the financial system in the Union and there are cross-border implications; (ii) no
competent national authority may have taken measures addressing the threat or such measures have
proven not to address the threat adequately. Furthermore, ESMA has to take into account whether the
measure does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage and does not have a detrimental effect on the
efficiency of financial markets, which is disproportionate to the benefits of the measure. Additionally,
ESMA’s measures may only be of a temporary nature and ESMA is required to review the measure at
appropriate intervals, at least every 3 months. ESMA is also required to consult the ESRB and, if
necessary, other relevant bodies and must notify the competent national authorities concerned of the
measure it proposes to take. The powers of ESMA are further delineated by a delegated act of the
Commission specifying criteria and factors to be taken into account in determining in which cases certain
adverse events or developments and threats to orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to
the stability of the whole or part of the financial system, arise. See Short Selling, paras. 46–53. The UK,
however, unsuccessfully, argued that ESMA’s determination as to whether these criteria are met, entails a
very large measure of discretion. Especially, it argued, that the judgement whether there is a ‘threat’ is
itself highly subjective. See: Short Selling, para. 28.
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ESMA in regard to short selling are precisely delineated and amenable to judicial
review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.
Accordingly, it found that those powers comply with the requirements laid down in
Meroni. Consequently, those powers do not imply that ESMA is vested with a ‘very
large measure of discretion’ that is incompatible with the Treaties.267
In line with the Short Selling ruling it could be argued that granting the ESRB the
power to designate non-bank financial institutions as systemically important is not
in breach of the Meroni constraints. Much the same conditions and restraints
applicable to ESMA’s short selling powers would be applicable to the designation
procedure as the ESRB too has to make an assessment of a possible threat to the
stability of the whole or part of the financial system. The Commission could provide
conditions detailing how such an assessment should be made in a delegated
regulation. Judicial review of a designation would also be possible as a designation
is of direct and individual concern to the subject institution, opening up proceedings,
under Article 263 TFEU, before the CJEU.
At the same time, we concede that in order to have in place a forward-looking
system for the monitoring and designation of systemically important institutions, it
is vital for the ESRB to have a degree of discretion. As the financial sector is ever
evolving, the ESRB should not be subject to extremely detailed conditions limiting
its ability to review and determine systemic relevance. As the FSOC too notes in its
final rule and interpretive guidance on non-bank SIFI designation, a determination
decision cannot be reduced to a formula.
In order to loosen possible Meroni constraints, final determination could be
subjected to validation by the Commission (or by non-objection within an
appropriate time-frame). As the Commission has a direct basis in the Treaties, it
is not subjected to Meroni constraints. Such an arrangement has, for the same
reasons, been used in the context of the Single Resolution Mechanism, where
resolution decisions by the Single Resolution Board are validated by the
Commission. Additionally, in the recent legislative proposal on supervision of
CCPs, ESMA may make a request to the Commission that a CCP may be of such
systemic importance that it will be able to provide services in the Union only if it
establishes itself in the EU. Again, the Commission, officially, makes the final
determination.
Alternatively, the ESRB or a newly created institution could be endowed with
designation powers in the Treaty. This might be the preferable option as it would
provide a strong legal basis, without complicating the governance structure by
including the Commission. However, as it would require a Treaty change it seems
politically unfeasible. On the other hand, political realities could turn out to
fluctuate more than the financial markets.
6.4 Non-bank SIFI Supervision
As described earlier, new prudential regulation in the US rearranged and expanded
financial regulation, supervision and resolution. FSOC-designated ‘systemically
267 Short Selling, paras. 53 and 54.
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important’ financial institutions are subject to the prudential regulations set out in
Title I of the Act and are supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (FRB). The latter has the discretion to impose additional, tailor-
made prudential standards and disclosure requirements.
Following the example set by the FSOC, a designation by the ESRB should have
the consequence of pulling a financial institution within an appropriate prudential
regulatory perimeter and related supervision. This is not to say that a one-size-fits-
all approach should be taken in determining prudential requirements. Instead,
regulators should have the discretion to set specific requirements reflecting the
specific business of a regulated entity. Following the example set by Dodd-Frank,268
this should include requirements in relation to capital, leverage limits, liquidity, risk
management, resolution planning and credit exposure reporting. Again, following
the US model, the prudential standards should be tailored, on an individual basis or
by category, to the designated institution. Such standards should reflect the
institutions’ capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities (including
the financial activities of their subsidiaries), size and any other risk-related factors.
In consequence, the resulting tailored prudential requirements address the systemic
risks while providing a fair regulatory burden, taking into account the specific
nature and activities of the institution.269
European supervision could be realised by having designated non-bank SIFIs fall
within the scope of the Banking Union. In addition to supervising significant
eurozone banks, the ECB would then also be charged with supervising of non-bank
financial institution designated by the ESRB as systemically important.270 In this
scenario it would be most sensible to have the ECB determine adequate prudential
requirements for the designated institution.
Alternatively, another EU entity could be charged with supervision. A possible
connection could be made with the intended or successive reforms of the European
Supervisory Agencies, as discussed in Sect. 5.2.2. Pursuant to a non-bank SIFI
designation by the ESRB, the ESA which has most affinity with the designate
institution would operate as direct prudential supervisor. Direct supervision by an
ESA is not unprecedented as ESMA already has direct supervisory tasks. Some
would prefer this option as it would remove the perception that designated
institutions are regulated and supervised as banks by the ECB. Moreover, as the
ECB, arguably, already has a conflict of interest between monetary policy and
prudential supervisory objectives, this would be even more the case if it were also to
268 12 US Code § 5365.
269 The proposed rules of the FRB regarding capital requirements for supervised institutions significantly
engaged in insurance activities in the US, follows a similar approach. See Sect. 4.2.
270 The ECB could in this process profit from experience gained in the course of the Supervisory and
Review Evaluation Process, in which the ECB has to ensure that credit institutions have adequate
arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms as well as capital and liquidity to ensure a sound
management and coverage of their risks, including risks institutions may pose to the financial system. See
CRD IV, Art. 97.
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supervise non-bank SIFIs.271 At the same time, the ECB could profit from the
resources and experiences gained in the context of the Banking Union and from a
comprehensive overview of the financial sector. We will limit ourselves to the more
fundamental contention that the prudential supervision of non-bank SIFIs, subject to
a determination by the ESRB, should be performed by an EU authority as opposed
to a national authority. It is, however, important to note that the scope of ECB
supervision in the context of the Banking Union currently coincides with that of the
eurozone as no additional Member States have acceded. This is more limited than
the scope of the ESAs which operate throughout the EU. We prefer a broader scope.
This touches upon an important, additional benefit of our proposed designation
and supervision scheme for systemically important institutions. As Schwarcz and
Zaring point out, the benefits of a non-bank SIFI identification and supervisory
scheme extend beyond the systemic risk mitigation of the supervised institution.
First, the possibility to take over or provide additional supervision of designated
firms deters the initial supervisors (if any, of course) of the non-bank institutions
from applying lax supervisory standards or neglecting to take proper account of
systemic risk.272 This dimension is of extra importance in the context of the EU
where non-bank financial regulation largely depends on national administration. As
stated, national supervisors are not well equipped to address systemic risks in cross-
border financial institutions. They are ill-positioned to have a comprehensive
overview of the risks present in a cross-border financial institution and are
predominantly mandated to address national (stability) concerns. National super-
visors might also feel tempted to practise supervisory forbearance by giving national
champions a competitive advantage. In such cases, the looming threat of losing
supervisory control to an EU authority would provide a strong incentive for national
supervisors to redouble their efforts. Moreover, an instruction from EU authorities
such as the ERSB itself or other agencies to national supervisors would have even
greater impact if non-compliance could lead to a non-bank SIFI designation by the
ERSB.
271 A conflict of interest could occur, for example, if the ECB were tempted to set interest rates beneficial
to ailing banks, thus making improper use of a monetary policy instrument. Conversely the Governing
Council might be inclined to include monetary policy interests in determining its approval of supervisory
decisions, such as the withdrawal of a credit institution’s authorisation. Schoenmaker and Ve´ron,
however, found in their review on the functioning of SSM during its first 18 months that supervisory tasks
have not been distorted or softened by the ECB’s monetary policy objectives. See Schoenmaker and
Ve´ron (2016), p. 25.
272 Schwarcz and Zaring indicate that the threat of designation incentivises primary regulators of non-banks
to implement reform aimed at limiting systemic risk and take proper account of changes in financial markets
which warrant a change in their regulatory approach. See Schwarcz and Zaring (2016), p. 41.
The probability of different priorities in supervision is also acknowledged, and lies at the basis of, the
FRB’s proposed capital requirements for institutions significantly engaged in insurance activities. The
proposed rules set capital requirements for the consolidated institution focusing inter alia on ‘enhancing
financial stability, and complement the primary mission of state insurance supervisors, which tends to
focus on the protection of policyholders’. See Federal Register, Capital Requirements for Supervised
Institutions Significantly Engaged in Insurance Activities, Vol. 81, No. 114, 14 June 2016.
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Another benefit of the designation regime is that it compels financial institutions
to exercise self-restraint when confronted with the threat of being designated as a
non-bank SIFI. Since, as already noted, the existing level of regulatory scrutiny is an
important factor for a non-bank SIFI determination, financial institutions which add
value through regulatory arbitrage activities might be deterred from engaging in
these activities if they knew that this might bring them within the scope of a non-
bank SIFI designation. In other words, the possibility of being designated as
systemically important curbs the risk appetite of institutions. As shown in Sect. 4.4,
these effects are already apparent in the US where General Electric has greatly
reduced its risk profile in a successful effort to have its non-bank SIFI status
rescinded.
6.4.1 Legal Feasibility
The scope of the SSM will have to be expanded in order to bring supervision of
designated non-bank SIFIs within the scope of the Banking Union. However, the
scope of the SSM is subject to Treaty limitations.
Article 127(6) TFEU grants the Council the power to confer specific tasks upon
the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance
undertakings. It follows that although the basic treaty provision allows for a
broader scope than merely credit institutions, the SSM does not reflect this. Instead
the design of the SSM was determined by the need to break the link between
sovereigns and banks, as joined supervision paved the way for the mutualisation of
bank bailouts.273
The scope of the SSM could therefore be expanded to include other financial
institutions, provided they do not qualify as insurance undertakings. It could,
perhaps, be argued that the term insurance undertaking should be narrowly defined
to exclude institutions that deal in bank-like products, as AIG did when it took large
positions in credit default swaps.
However, a more legally satisfying approach, albeit perhaps a politically less
feasible one, would be to amend the TFEU. The primary function of such an
amendment would be to confer on a European body the power to supervise all non-
bank SIFI designated entities. Logically, this would be the same body as is in charge
of supervision under the SSM.
Alternatively, a European Supervisory Agency could be tasked with the direct
prudential supervision of designated non-bank SIFIs. To this end the EU legislators
could adopt a regulation on based on Article 114 TFEU in which they delegate these
task to a European agency. Article 114 TFEU provides a suitable legal basis as EU
supervision harmonises the supervisory practices and thereby improves the
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This is
also in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality since the
execution of supervision at the EU level is motivated, precisely because,
fragmentised supervision at the national level has proven inadequate. Additionally,
273 Moloney (2014b), p. 1624.
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proportionality is an important element in the determination whether or not to
designate a financial institutions as a non-bank SIFI and placing it under direct
supervision.
In view of the Short Selling judgement, direct prudential supervision by an EU
agency seems legally possible when the execution of supervision is circumscribed
by various conditions and criteria which limit the agencies discretion and the
possibility of judicial protection against the agency’s acts. However, while the
ECJ’s ‘mellowing’ of Meroni through the Short Selling case provides a legal
window to task supervision of non-bank SIFIs with an EU agency, the associated
legal uncertainty is troublesome. Furthermore, the fact that no regulatory powers
may be conferred to the agency renders it impossible for the agency to adopt
tailored prudential requirements for non-bank SIFIs without approval by an EU
institution with a Treaty basis.
6.5 Non-Bank SIFI Resolution
A credible resolution regime for non-bank SIFIs is of paramount importance in
order to create a credible alternative to publicly funded bailouts and help safeguard
financial stability by providing for orderly liquidation and allowing for the
continued operation of systemically important business processes. Such a regime
subjects non-bank SIFIs to market discipline as it cancels out their Too-Big-To-Fail
status and associated implicit guarantees.
The European Banking Union (EBU) provides a resolution regime for banks and,
subject to certain conditions, their parent companies if they are a financial holding
company or mixed financial holding company. Additionally, 730k investment firms
and financial institutions’ subsidiaries may also fall within the resolution scope of
the EBU. This creates a complicated and opaque resolution regime with some
entities within a group falling within the resolution scope and others not. The scope
of resolution is governed not by the systemic risk posed by an institution and
whether this may be mitigated by placing it under resolution but instead by
inflexible and arbitrary legal norms.
This leads to regulatory gaps, regulatory arbitrage, an unlevel playing field and
an incomplete toolbox for addressing systemic risk, which may manifest itself in
different and to some extent unknown forms. A resolution regime needs to reflect
this. Therefore non-bank SIFIs should also qualify for liquidation under a European
resolution mechanism. This creates a more flexible, open-ended and forward-
looking approach aimed at preventing the next crisis, not the last one.
Inspiration can, again, be drawn from the resolution regime created by the Dodd-
Frank Act in the US. This regime, known as the Orderly Liquidation Authority
(OLA), captures any non-bank financial institution whose failure would seriously
impact financial stability in the US.
A possible way of strengthening the European resolution regime and mitigating
the systemic risks stemming from non-bank entities would be to widen the scope of
the SRM to include all financial institutions that pose systemic risk.
It should be remembered that the legal basis of the SRM is Article 114 TFEU,
which provides a basis for the adoption of measures for the approximation of the
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provisions in Member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market. According to the European Court of Justice
(CJEU), measures under Article 114 TFEU must genuinely have as its object the
improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal
market.274
A centralised European resolution authority aims to ensure a uniform application
of resolution rules. This enhances the proper functioning of the internal market,
specifically in the field of financial services as it eliminates, national, fragmentised
resolution rules and thus improves the level playing field. Additionally, its main
objective is to strengthen financial stability in the EU: an essential prerequisite for
the functioning of the internal market.
This leads to the conclusion that a resolution scheme for non-bank SIFIs or an
expansion of the SRM to include such entities does not need Treaty change. Instead,
it can be established in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure on the
basis of Article 114 TFEU.
7 Conclusions
The global financial crisis revealed that the migration of financial activities outside
the traditional banking sector was accompanied by a huge and unchecked build-up
of systemic risk. National and/or sectorally organised regulation and supervision
proved insufficient owing to the continued integration and interconnectedness of
financial markets, institutions, products and services. Gaps in the coverage of
regulation and supervision led to an inconsistent regulatory treatment of equivalent
products and/or services. This in turn caused an unlevel playing field and
encouraged regulatory arbitrage behaviour, which caused a migration of activities
and a build-up of systemic risk in the less regulated or unregulated parts of the
financial system.
We propose that equivalent financial products and/or services should be subject
to an integrated European regulatory and supervisory approach. Above all,
institutions that pose systemic risk should be brought within a regulatory perimeter
consistent with the risk they pose to financial stability.
A European body should therefore be in charge of monitoring financial
institutions active in the EU, and should identify institutions which pose systemic
risk. It should, subsequently, have the discretion to designate a non-bank financial
firm as a non-bank SIFI. Such designation would ensure a level of regulatory and
supervision consistent with the risks to financial stability posed by a financial
institution. Given its current tasks, the European Systemic Risk Board seems best
suited for this task.
After an institution has been designated as non-bank SIFI, it comes under
European supervision. As such a regime has been created for banks in the form of
the European Banking Union, designated non-bank SIFIs should be brought within
the perimeter of the EBU. While the Treaties exclude insurance companies, other
274 See Case 376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, para. 84.
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financial institutions can be brought under supervision of the ECB without the need
for Treaty change. The ECB would then be able to supervise and impose enhanced
prudential standards on designated non-bank SIFIs. Alternatively, another EU entity
could be charged with supervision, for example the relevant ESA.
In keeping with the second pillar of the EBU, a regime should also be in place to
ensure that non-bank SIFIs can be resolved without causing systemic risk. This
would resolve the Too-Big-To-Fail dilemma and subject the institutions concerned
to market discipline. A connection could be made with the EBU’s second pillar by
expanding the scope of the SRM to include designated non-bank SIFIs. Such an
inclusion could be based on Article 114 TFEU, as the alleviation of systemic risk
greatly improves the functioning of the internal market.
The development of such a regime could be based on the example of the US,
where the Dodd-Frank Act provides for the designation of non-bank SIFIs and their
regulation, supervision and possible resolution.
Ensuring that non-bank SIFIs are properly regulated, supervised and, if
necessary, resolved would help to eliminate supervisory and regulatory gaps,
reduce regulatory arbitrage activities, enhance the level playing field and contribute
to the stability of the financial system as a whole.
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